Mauricio Isaac Rivera-Ibanez v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MAURICIO ISAAC RIVERA-IBANEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 23-454
Agency No.
A200-975-662
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 26, 2024**
Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and KOH, Circuit Judges.
Mauricio Isaac Rivera-Ibanez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions
pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing
his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his applications for
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 17 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de
novo the legal question of whether a particular social group is cognizable, except
to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation of the governing
statutes and regulations. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241-42 (9th Cir.
2020). We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Id. at
1241. We deny the petition for review.
Because Rivera-Ibanez does not challenge the agency’s determination that
he conceded through counsel he was ineligible for asylum, we do not address
it. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013). We also
do not address Rivera-Ibanez’s contention that his untimely asylum application
warrants an exception because the BIA did not deny relief on that ground. See
Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In reviewing
the decision of the BIA, we consider only the grounds relied upon by that agency.”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, Rivera-Ibanez’s asylum
claim fails.
Because Rivera-Ibanez does not challenge the agency’s determination that
he failed to establish past persecution, we do not address it. See Lopez-Vasquez,
706 F.3d at 1079-80. As to his fear of future persecution, the BIA did not err in
concluding that Rivera-Ibanez failed to establish membership in a cognizable
particular social group. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016)

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(to demonstrate membership in a particular social group, “[t]he applicant must
‘establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a common
immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct
within the society in question’” (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227,
237 (BIA 2014))); Nguyen v. Barr, 983 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2020) (“The
particularity element requires characteristics that provide a clear benchmark for
determining who falls within the group,” and “[t]he group must also be discrete
and have definable boundaries—it must not be amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or
subjective.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
Rivera-Ibanez’s contention that the IJ failed to state the relevant law
regarding particular social groups is not properly before the court because he failed
to raise it before the BIA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (exhaustion of administrative
remedies required); see also Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 417-19
(2023) (section 1252(d)(1) is a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule).
In light of this disposition, we need not reach Rivera-Ibanez’s remaining
contentions regarding his withholding of removal claim. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft,
371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies are not required to decide
issues unnecessary to the results they reach). Thus, Rivera-Ibanez’s withholding of
removal claim fails.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT protection

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because petitioner failed to show it is more likely than not he will be tortured by or
with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to El Salvador. See
Zheng v. Holder, 644 F.3d 829, 835-36 (9th Cir. 2011) (possibility of torture too
speculative). We reject Rivera-Ibanez’s claims the agency applied the incorrect
legal standard or otherwise erred in its analysis as unsupported by the record.
Thus, Rivera-Ibanez’s CAT claim fails.
We reject Rivera-Ibanez’s contention the BIA erred by only listing the last
name of the Appellate Immigration Judge in its decision where he points to no
authority requiring the BIA to list the judge’s full name.
Rivera-Ibanez’s motion for appointment of counsel (Docket Entry No. 23) is
denied.
The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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