United States of America v. Armando Diaz-Rogel

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ARMANDO DIAZ-ROGEL,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 23-1977
D.C. No. 3:20-cr-00809-DMS-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Dana M. Sabraw, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 26, 2024**
Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and KOH, Circuit Judges.
Armando Diaz-Rogel appeals from the district court’s judgment and
challenges the 6-month term of imprisonment imposed upon the revocation of his
supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1291, and we affirm.
As a preliminary matter, the government is incorrect that Diaz-Rogel’s
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 4 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 2 --

2 23-1977
appeal is moot. See United States v. Verdin, 243 F.3d 1174, 1178 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding that an appeal is not moot if success on appeal could result in a reduction
in the period of supervised release).
Diaz-Rogel contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because
the district court gave insufficient weight to his attempts to overcome his drug
addiction. The district court did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The below-Guidelines sentence is substantively
reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) sentencing factors and the totality of
the circumstances, including Diaz-Rogel’s serious breaches of the court’s trust and
his criminal history. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; United States v. Gutierrez-Sanchez,
587 F.3d 904, 908 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The weight to be given the various factors in a
particular case is for the discretion of the district court.”); United States v. Simtob,
485 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2007) (purpose of revocation sentence is to sanction
the defendant’s breach of the district court’s trust). Moreover, contrary to Diaz-
Rogel’s contention, the record reflects that the district court gave due consideration
to the § 3583(e) sentencing factors and sufficiently explained the sentence. See
United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992-93 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
AFFIRMED.

-- 2 of 2 --