Alim Urmancheev v. Hunter;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALIM URMANCHEEV,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
HUNTER; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 22-15701
D.C. No. 1:19-cv-00791-DAD-BAK
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 26, 2024**
Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and KOH, Circuit Judges.
Former California state prisoner Alim Urmancheev appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging access-to-
courts and deprivation of property claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 29 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 22-15701
2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d
443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Urmancheev’s access-to-courts claim
because Urmancheev failed to show actual injury to a nonfrivolous legal claim.
See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348-53 (1996) (explaining that an access-to-
courts claim requires a plaintiff to show that defendants’ conduct caused an actual
injury to a nonfrivolous legal claim); see also Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S.
403, 415-17 (2002) (to plead an actual injury for an access-to-courts claim, the
complaint “should state the underlying claim . . . just as if it were being
independently pursued”).
The district court properly dismissed Urmancheev’s deprivation of property
claim because Urmancheev failed to allege facts sufficient to show that a
meaningful post-deprivation remedy was unavailable to him. See Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532-33 (1984) (a deprivation of property, whether random
or intentional, is not actionable if the state provides a meaningful post-deprivation
remedy); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (“California
[l]aw provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any property
deprivations.”).

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3 22-15701
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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