Michael Moshe Perry v. NP PARC CHATEAUX, LLC, and Incorporated;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL MOSHE PERRY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NP PARC CHATEAUX, LLC, and
Incorporated; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 23-55211
D.C. No. 2:22-cv-05378-FLA-MAA
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Fernando L. Aenlle-Rocha, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 26, 2024**
Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and KOH, Circuit Judges.
Michael Moshe Perry appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action alleging claims related to his eviction. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under the Rooker-
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 28 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Perry’s action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Perry’s claims are a “de
facto appeal” of a prior state court judgment or are “inextricably intertwined” with
that judgment. Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004)
(“[The] Rooker-Feldman [doctrine] prohibits a federal district court from
exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a
state court judgment.”); Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163 (“It is a forbidden de facto appeal
under Rooker-Feldman when the plaintiff in federal district court complains of a
legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the
judgment of that court.”); see also Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir.
2012) (explaining that Rooker-Feldman bars “inextricably intertwined” claims
where federal adjudication “would impermissibly undercut the state ruling on the
same issues” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declaring Perry a vexatious
litigant and entering a pre-filing review order against him because all of the
requirements were met. See Ringgold-Lockhart v. County of Los Angeles, 761
F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth standard of review and requirements

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for pre-filing orders).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Perry’s motion to
disqualify the district court judge because Perry failed to show extrajudicial bias or
prejudice. See Thomassen v. United States, 835 F.2d 727, 732 (9th Cir. 1987)
(setting forth standard of review and requirements to prevail on a disqualification
motion).
The district court properly denied as moot Perry’s motion to supplement the
complaint, as well as the motion for an extension of time to answer or otherwise
respond to the complaint filed by NP Parc Chateaux, LLC, NP Parc Chateaux, Inc.,
Kevin Derosa, Christina Romero, and Greystar Real Estate Partners, LLC, because
the action had already been dismissed. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v.
Corey, 913 F.3d 940, 949 (9th Cir. 2019) (standard of review).
We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal, or matters
not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett
v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Perry’s motion to file an oversized reply brief (Docket Entry No. 38) is
granted. The Clerk will file Perry’s reply brief received at Docket Entry No. 40.

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All other pending motions and requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.

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