In re: MARK TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION v. HELEN RYAN FRAZER, Chapter 7 Trustee

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: MARK TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION,
Debtor.
______________________________
MARK G. JONES,
Appellant,
v.
HELEN RYAN FRAZER, Chapter 7
Trustee,
Appellee.
No. 21-56216
D.C. No. 5:21-cv-01160-PA
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 20, 2024**
San Francisco, California
Before: FRIEDLAND, SANCHEZ, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 25 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Appellant Mark G. Jones appeals the district court’s order dismissing his
bankruptcy appeal and affirming the bankruptcy court’s order granting the Chapter
7 Trustee’s Final Application Allowing Payment of Fees and Expenses of Trustee
and Professionals (“Final Fee Order”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
158(d)(1). We affirm.
The district court concluded that Jones does not have standing to appeal the
Final Fee Order under the “persons aggrieved” doctrine because Jones does not
have a pecuniary interest in the Final Fee Order. We review the factual
determination that an individual is a person aggrieved for clear error. See Matter
of E. Coast Foods, Inc., 80 F.4th 901, 905 (9th Cir. 2023).
The district court did not err in concluding that Jones lacks standing to
appeal the Final Fee Order. We have long held that only someone who is “directly
and adversely affected pecuniarily” by a bankruptcy court’s order has standing to
appeal that order. Matter of Point Ctr. Fin., Inc., 890 F.3d 1188, 1191 (9th Cir.
2018) (citing Matter of Fondiller, 707 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983)). We have
also held that “a hopelessly insolvent debtor does not have standing to appeal
orders affecting the size of the estate.” Matter of Fondiller, 707 F.2d at 442.
As the district court explained, the debtor in this case is “hopelessly
insolvent” and therefore would not have standing to appeal the Final Fee Order.
This is because the debtor’s bankruptcy estate had secured scheduled claims of

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$24,962,169.91, unsecured scheduled claims of $8,483,370.91, and gross receipts
of just $3,732,972.26. Because the debtor itself lacks standing to challenge the
Final Fee Order, the district court correctly concluded that Jones, who is an indirect
owner of the debtor, also lacks a direct pecuniary interest and therefore lacks
standing to challenge the order. See id.1
AFFIRMED.
1 Because we conclude that Jones does not have standing to pursue this appeal, we
do not reach the Trustee’s alternative argument that this appeal is equitably moot.
See Rev Op Grp. v. ML Manager LLC (In re Mortgs. Ltd.), 771 F.3d 1211, 1214
(9th Cir. 2014).

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