Oscar Luis Corella-Beltran v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
OSCAR LUIS CORELLA-BELTRAN,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 22-899
Agency No.
A091-851-828
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted March 4, 2024
Las Vegas, Nevada
Before: M. SMITH, BENNETT, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Oscar Corella-Beltran petitions for review of an order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determining that he was removable because
his prior assault convictions were aggravated felonies. Because the parties are
familiar with the facts, we do not repeat them here, except as necessary to provide
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED
MAR 15 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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context to our decision. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we
deny the petition.
Petitioner’s conviction under “A.R.S. §§ 13-1204(A)(3), 13-1203(A)(1), (2),
and (3)” (Count 9) is an aggravated felony under the meaning of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Under the modified categorical approach, “we may examine
a limited class of judicially noticeable documents to determine whether the
alternative corresponding to the generic offense was the basis of the conviction.”
United States v. Sahagun-Gallegos, 782 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 2015). When a
defendant’s conviction was based on a guilty plea, such documents include the
“charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any
explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented.”
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005).
The factual basis provided at the change of plea hearing, and Petitioner’s
assent to it, establishes for purposes of the modified categorical approach that
Petitioner was convicted of an aggravated felony. Petitioner’s counsel at the
change of plea hearing specifically stated that “[Petitioner] committed aggravated
assault by intentionally touching Officer Gamez with the intent to injure.” That
language tracks the language of Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1203(A)(3), which
provides that a person commits assault by “[k]nowingly touching another person
with the intent to injure . . .” Because an intentional mens rea necessarily includes

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a knowing mens rea, Petitioner “necessarily admitted [the] elements of” subsection
(A)(3), which, together with the accompanying aggravating factor, constitutes a
crime of violence. Shephard, 544 U.S. at 26. And because Petitioner’s conviction
under Count 9 is a crime of violence, we need not reach his arguments concerning
his conviction under Count 4 to conclude that his removability has been
established.
The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.
The motion for a stay of removal is otherwise denied.
PETITION DENIED.

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