United States of America v. ELWOOD STAUDINGER, Jr.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ELWOOD STAUDINGER, Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 22-10298
D.C. No.
1:11-cr-00608-LEK-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Leslie E. Kobayashi, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 12, 2024**
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: PAEZ, M. SMITH, and KOH, Circuit Judges.
Elwood Staudinger, Jr., (“Staudinger”) appeals the district court’s denial of
his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the parties are familiar with the
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 13 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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facts, we do not recount them here, except as necessary to provide context to our
ruling. We affirm the district court’s denial of the motion for compassionate
release.
A compassionate release decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 2021). “A district court may
abuse its discretion if it does not apply the correct law or if it rests its decision on a
clearly erroneous finding of material fact.” Id. (quoting United States v. Dunn, 728
F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2013)). When a defendant moves for compassionate
release under § 3582(c)(1)(A), a court must determine, inter alia, “whether
extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction.” United States
v. Wright, 46 F.4th 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up).
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that
Staudinger did not establish extraordinary and compelling reasons to grant relief.
Staudinger argues that non-retroactive changes in the law would reduce his offense
level from 34 to 31 if he were sentenced today. At his original sentencing, the
district court varied downward significantly from the advisory Sentencing
Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months to arrive at a sentence of 200 months.
According to Staudinger, the applicable Guidelines range today would be 168 to
210 months. Staudinger thus argues that applying the same downward variance
today would result in a sentence significantly below his 200-month sentence.

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We have recognized that although non-retroactive changes in sentencing law
may be proffered “as an argument for extraordinary and compelling reasons under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A),” a defendant must demonstrate that those changes “rise to the
level of ‘extraordinary and compelling’ in his individualized circumstances.”
United States v. Chen, 48 F.4th 1092, 1100 (9th Cir. 2022). Here, the district court
did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that changes in the Guidelines did
not “rise to the level of extraordinary and compelling” in Staudinger’s
“individualized circumstances” because the court would impose the same sentence
today. Id.
The record supports the district court’s determination that it would sentence
Staudinger to 200 months’ imprisonment even under today’s more lenient
Guidelines range based on the facts of the offense and Staudinger’s personal
characteristics, such as his 25 prior adult convictions, including 14 crimes of
violence. Moreover, if he were sentenced today, Staudinger’s Guidelines range
would be 168 to 210 months. Staudinger’s 200 month sentence is well within that
range. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Staudinger’s motion for release.
AFFIRMED.

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