Tri Minh Huynh v. WALMART, INC., A Delaware corporation

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TRI MINH HUYNH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WALMART, INC., A Delaware corporation;
DOUG MCMILLON; BRETT BIGGS;
MARC LORE; THE DERUBERTIS LAW
FIRM, APC; DAVID M. DERUBERTIS;
BOFA SECURITIES, INC.; ROBERT F.
OHMES,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
WAL-MART.COM USA LLC; RACHEL
BRAND; GREGORY B. PENNER;
TIMOTHY P. FLYNN; S. ROBSON
WALTON; SETH BEAL; VALERIE
RICETTI; AUDREY AU JOULINA;
MELVENIA HA; EUGENE SCALIA;
RYAN CARLTON STEWART; CHRIS
WILSON; SUSANNA G. SCHUEMANN;
MARK MARCHIONE; KARI
DERUBERTIS; KATHY VON LINDERN;
RENEE QUEZADA; ORRICK,
HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP;
PAYNE & FEARS LLP; BANK OF
No. 22-16188
D.C. No. 3:22-cv-00142-JSC
MEMORANDUM*
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED
MAR 5 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2 22-16188
AMERICA CORPORATION; MATTHEW
BOYLE,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jacqueline Scott Corley, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 21, 2024**
Before: FERNANDEZ, CALLAHAN, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Tri Minh Huynh appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
for failure to state a claim his action brought under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo. Puri v. Khalsa, 844 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017).
We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Huynh’s action because Huynh failed
to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants formed an enterprise with a
common purpose. See Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 547, 552 (9th Cir.
2007) (en banc) (setting forth elements of a RICO claim and explaining that “an
associated-in-fact enterprise is a group of persons associated together for a
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Huynh’s request for oral
argument, set forth in the opening brief, is denied.

-- 2 of 3 --

3 22-16188
common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)); Howard v. Am. Online Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 751 (9th Cir.
2000) (“[F]ailure to adequately plead a substantive violation of RICO precludes a
claim for conspiracy.”); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009)
(conclusory allegations are not entitled to a presumption of truth).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Huynh’s motion for
reconsideration because Huynh failed to demonstrate any basis for relief. See
Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth
standard of review and discussing factors for granting a motion for reconsideration
under Rule 59(e)); see also Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d
1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (leave to amend may be denied where amendment
would be futile).
All pending motions and requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --