John C. Stuart v. Sherry K. Stephens

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHN C. STUART,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SHERRY K. STEPHENS; STATE OF
ARIZONA; KEITH MUNSON;
RICHMOND, First name unknown; named
as Mrs./Ms. Richmond; JENNIFER
RICHMOND, Librarian at Red Rock Private
Prison; JENNIFER RYAN-TOUHILL, Judge
at Maricopa County Superior Court;
UNKNOWN PARTIES, named as John/Jane
Does 1-99,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 22-16722
D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00538-GMS-ESW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 21, 2024**
Before: FERNANDEZ, NGUYEN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 27 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 22-16722
Arizona state prisoner John C. Stuart appeals pro se from the district court’s
judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000).
We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Stuart’s claims against defendants
Stephens and Ryan-Touhill as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),
because success on Stuart’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction, and Stuart has not demonstrated that his conviction has been
invalidated. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (holding that if “a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence
. . . the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
conviction or sentence has already been invalidated”).
The district court properly dismissed Stuart’s claims against defendants
Munson and Richmond because Stuart failed to allege facts sufficient to show that
either defendant denied Stuart access to the courts or retaliated against Stuart. See
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348-53 (1996) (explaining that an access-to-courts
claim requires a plaintiff to show that defendants’ conduct caused an actual injury
to a nonfrivolous legal claim); Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir.
2005) (setting forth elements of a retaliation claim in the prison context).

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3 22-16722
The district court properly dismissed Stuart’s remaining claims because
Stuart failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Hebbe v.
Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that although pro se
pleadings are construed liberally, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations
sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief).
We reject as meritless Stuart’s contentions that the district court erred by
failing to construe Stuart’s action as a qui tam action or was biased against him.
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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