Aura Marina Velasquez Reyes v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AURA MARINA VELASQUEZ REYES,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 21-70287
Agency No. A209-875-492
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 14, 2024**
University of Hawaii, Manoa
Before: PAEZ, M. SMITH, and KOH, Circuit Judges.
Aura Marina Velasquez Reyes (“Velasquez Reyes”), a native and citizen of
Guatemala, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 27 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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(“BIA”) denying her application for asylum and withholding of removal.1 We have
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) and review for substantial evidence the
agency’s adverse credibility determination. See Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034,
1039 (9th Cir. 2010). Under this “highly deferential standard,” “administrative
findings [are] conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to
conclude to the contrary.” Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 365 (2021) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692,
(2020); then quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). We deny the petition for review.
The BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s (IJ) determination that Velasquez
Reyes failed to timely file her asylum application and failed to establish eligibility
for withholding of removal because she was not credible. Because the adverse
credibility finding is dispositive of Velasquez Reyes’s asylum and withholding of
removal claims, we need not address Velasquez Reyes’s challenges regarding the
timeliness of her asylum claim.2
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility finding. The
record supports the agency’s conclusion that (1) Velasquez Reyes testified
1 The BIA concluded that Velasquez Reyes waived her claim for relief under the
Convention Against Torture. Velasquez Reyes does not challenge this conclusion
in her opening brief. Thus, Velasquez Reyes has waived any challenge to this
claim. See Alanniz v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1061, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2019).
2 Because we do not reach Velasquez Reyes’s asylum arguments, we deny her
motion to supplement the record (Dkt. 34) as moot.

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inconsistently and made material omissions and (2) failed to corroborate her
claims.
1. The agency based its adverse credibility determination on
inconsistencies between Velasquez Reyes’s statements during her border
interview, credible fear interview, and hearing testimony. Most notably, Velasquez
Reyes initially identified one basis for her asylum claim at her border and credible
fear interview, but later presented a second basis for her claim in her asylum
application and testimony. The agency found that these inconsistencies and
omissions undermined Velazquez Reyes’s credibility. The agency did not accept
Velasquez Reyes’s explanations for the inconsistencies and omissions. None of
Velasquez Reyes’s challenges to the adverse credibility finding compel a decision
contrary to that of the agency. See Ming Dai, 593 U.S. at 369.
2. Although Velasquez Reyes provided evidence to corroborate her
claim, the agency permissibly concluded that the totality of the circumstances
indicated that she was not credible. In sum, the agency’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence.3
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
3 We do not reach Velasquez’s arguments with regard to the IJ’s application of
Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), vacated by Matter of A-B-, 28 I.
& N. Dec. 307 (A.G. 2021), because the adverse credibility determination is
dispositive.

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