Martin Dominguez-Robles v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

22-1083Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitFeb 14, 2024

Full text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARTIN DOMINGUEZ-ROBLES,*
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 22-1083
Agency No.
A070-123-745
MEMORANDUM**
On Petition for Review of an Order of an
Immigration Judge
Submitted February 9, 2024***
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: BERZON, HURWITZ, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.
Martin Dominguez-Robles, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
* The Clerk shall edit the case name and caption to reflect the spelling
of the petitioner’s last name—Dominguez-Robles—used in the agency decision on
review and in petitioner’s opening brief.
** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
*** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 14 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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review of the determination of an immigration judge (“IJ”) that he does not have a
reasonable fear of persecution or torture. We review the IJ’s negative reasonable
fear determination for substantial evidence. See Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828
F.3d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 2016). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252,
see Alonso-Juarez v. Garland, 80 F.4th 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2023), and we deny
the petition.
1. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that the particular
social group proposed by Dominguez is not socially distinct. See Diaz-Torres v.
Barr, 963 F.3d 976, 980-81 (9th Cir. 2020). Neither the record evidence nor
Dominguez’s testimony compels the conclusion that individuals who cooperate
with law enforcement are viewed as socially distinct within Mexican society.
Dominguez did not participate in any legal proceedings or file a formal report with
the police, and the Mexican witness protection program he identified would not
extend to him or his proposed social group. See Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d
1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining that “the absence of society-specific
evidence of social distinction”—including the lack of “special legal protection” for
those who make reports to the police—supported the conclusion that the proposed
group was not socially distinct).
2. Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s determination that Dominguez
failed to establish a reasonable possibility that he would be tortured in Mexico with

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the acquiescence of the government. First, the record evidence supports the IJ’s
finding that the Mexican government is taking steps to address violence and
corruption caused by organized crime groups. See Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755
F.3d 1026, 1035 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that government efforts to combat crime
and violence supported a finding that there was no government acquiescence even
when those efforts “ha[d] not achieved the desired goals of resolving crimes and
protecting citizens”). Second, Dominguez’s testimony about the potential
inefficacy of local police efforts to protect him does not constitute “significant
evidence establishing government complicity in the criminal activity,” especially
where, as here, he also testified that local police would try to help him and that
they have previously responded to a violent crime and apprehended the suspect.
Andrade-Garcia, 828 F.3d at 836.
The motion and supplemental motion for stay of removal are DENIED as
moot.1
PETITION DENIED.
1 The temporary stay of removal shall remain in effect until issuance of the
mandate. See General Order 6.4(c).

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