Raul Arellano v. HARMONY MELTON, Nurse

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAUL ARELLANO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
HARMONY MELTON, Nurse,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 22-55072
D.C. No.
3:15-cv-02069-JAH-AGS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
John A. Houston, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 6, 2024
Pasadena, California
Before: OWENS, BUMATAY, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Raul Arellano appeals from the district court’s order
granting judgment as a matter of law for Defendant-Appellee Harmony Melton and
dismissing his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his Eighth Amendment
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 and “review the district court’s grant of a motion for judgment as a
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED
FEB 8 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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matter of law de novo.” Velazquez v. City of Long Beach, 793 F.3d 1010, 1017
(9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.
1. The district court correctly granted judgment as a matter of law for
Melton because no reasonable jury could find for Arellano on his § 1983 claim. A
court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law “[i]f a party has been
fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury
would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that
issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). At trial, Melton produced considerable evidence
showing that she was not disbursing medication in Arellano’s building on July 22,
2014. And Arellano failed to meaningfully challenge that evidence. Arellano
testified that Melton denied him his medication on July 22. He also insinuated that
the prison’s records may have been inaccurate since Melton’s sign-out sheet was
left blank on July 22. But a jury could not reasonably infer, on the basis of the
scant evidence that Arellano presented, that Melton denied Arellano his medication
on July 22. See Brit. Airways Bd. v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 1978)
(“A mere scintilla of evidence will not do, for a jury is permitted to draw only
those inferences of which the evidence is reasonably susceptible; it may not resort
to speculation.”).
Our precedent supports the district court’s decision. Arellano relies heavily
on Velazquez¸ a case where we reversed the district court for granting judgment as

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a matter of law when a reasonable jury could have found for the nonmoving party.
793 F.3d at 1022. But Velazquez does not dictate reversal here. In that case, “the
evidence was far from ‘one-sided’” and did not lead to “one reasonable conclusion
as to the verdict,” but the district court still granted judgment as a matter of law.
Id. at 1021–22 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 245, 250, 252
(1986)). Unlike in Velazquez where a genuine dispute existed over competing
versions of an event, no reasonable jury could find Arellano’s conclusory
statements and conjecture sufficient to defeat Melton’s evidence.
2. On appeal, Melton moves to correct the record and for judicial notice
under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e)(2)(C). We grant the motion to
correct the record by including Jaime Wood’s excerpted deposition transcript, as it
was before the trial court and “reflects what actually occurred in the district court.”
See Townsend v. Columbia Operations, 667 F.2d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 1982)
(correcting record where four documents before trial court were omitted from
original record). Additionally, we grant the motion for judicial notice of counsels’
correspondence designating excerpts of Wood’s testimony for use at trial. The
correspondence “is not subject to reasonable dispute” and “can be accurately and
readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned”
because it involves the parties’ own statements about which excerpts to play at
trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).

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AFFIRMED.

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