Scott York, an individual v. United States of America;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SCOTT YORK, an individual,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 23-55122
D.C. No. 2:22-cv-09127-JAK-SP
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 17, 2024**
Before: S.R. THOMAS, McKEOWN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Scott York appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his
action alleging various federal claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo a sua sponte dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Omar v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 24 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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1987). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed York’s action because York failed to
allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. See id. (explaining that a district
court may dismiss sua sponte under Rule 12(b)(6) “without notice where the
claimant cannot possibly win relief”); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (explaining that to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face,” and that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing without leave to
amend because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review
and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper if amendment
would be futile).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying York’s requests for
injunctive relief because York failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the
merits of his claims. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559
F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth standard of review and explaining
that a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that the plaintiff is

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likely to succeed on the merits).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
York’s motion for injunctive relief on appeal and judicial notice (Docket
Entry No. 6) is denied.
AFFIRMED.

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