Erick Alexander Ramos Bonilla; v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ERICK ALEXANDER RAMOS
BONILLA; et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 23-696
Agency Nos.
A209-830-705
A209-437-997
A209-830-706
A209-437-998
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted January 17, 2024**
Before: S.R. THOMAS, McKEOWN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Erick Alexander Ramos Bonilla, his wife, and their two minor children,
natives and citizens of El Salvador, petition pro se for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 23 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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decision denying their request for a continuance and their applications for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of
discretion the denial of a continuance and review for substantial evidence the
agency’s factual findings. Ahmed v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2009).
We deny the petition for review.
The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ request for a
continuance where they did not demonstrate good cause. See id. (factors
considered in reviewing the denial of a continuance); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29.
We do not disturb the agency’s determination that petitioners failed to
establish they suffered harm that rises to the level of persecution. See
Baghdasaryan v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010) (applicant who
alleges past persecution has burden of proving that the treatment rises to the level
of persecution); see also Flores Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626, 633 n.2 (9th Cir.
2022) (court need not resolve whether de novo or substantial evidence review
applies, where result would be the same under either standard).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that petitioners
failed to establish they would be persecuted on account of a family-based
particular social group or a political opinion. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S.
478, 483 (1992) (an applicant “must provide some evidence of [motive], direct or

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circumstantial”); Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir. 2009) (political
opinion claim rejected where petitioner did not present sufficient evidence of
political or ideological opposition to the gang’s ideals or that the gang imputed a
particular political belief to the petitioner); see also Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d
1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (an applicant’s “desire to be free from harassment by
criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus
to a protected ground”).
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determination that
petitioners failed to establish an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution
on account of their membership in a particular social group of “women in El
Salvador.” See Nagoulko v. INS, 333 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (possibility
of future persecution “too speculative”). Further, on this record, petitioners failed
to establish a pattern or practice of persecution of women in El Salvador. See
Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1060-62 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussion of the
standard for establishing a pattern or practice of persecution).
Thus, petitioners’ asylum and withholding of removal claims fail. See
Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 359-60 (9th Cir. 2017).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT protection
because petitioners failed to show it is more likely than not they will be tortured by

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or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to El Salvador.
See Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009).
Petitioners’ contentions regarding ineffective assistance of counsel are not
properly before the court because they failed to raise them before the BIA. See
8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (exhaustion of administrative remedies required); see also
Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 417-19 (2023) (section 1252(d)(1) is a
non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule); Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815-16
(9th Cir. 2007) (ineffective assistance of counsel claims must be raised in a motion
to reopen before the BIA).
The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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