Ramona Domingo-Castillo v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAMONA DOMINGO-CASTILLO,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 23-299
Agency No.
A209-802-880
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted January 11, 2024**
Pasadena, California
Before: TALLMAN, CALLAHAN, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Ramona Domingo-Castillo petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) order denying her motion to reopen based on alleged ineffective
assistance of counsel. Exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, we deny the
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 16 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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petition. We review for abuse of discretion the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen.
Singh v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2004). We review de novo
questions of law. Id.
An immigration judge (IJ) determined that Domingo-Castillo had abandoned
any claims for relief from removal because she filed no applications for relief by
the deadline set by the IJ.1 Thus, the IJ ordered her removed. Represented by new
counsel, Domingo-Castillo filed a notice of appeal with the BIA. The notice did
not challenge the IJ’s abandonment determination but indicated that Domingo-
Castillo intended to file a brief. Her attorney, however, never filed a brief, and so
the BIA summarily dismissed her appeal. Domingo-Castillo then moved to reopen
based on ineffective assistance of counsel by her attorney who appeared before the
BIA.
Because her attorney failed to file a brief, Domingo-Castillo is entitled to a
presumption of prejudice. Singh, 367 F.3d at 1189. But even when the
presumption applies, to establish the requisite prejudice, the petitioner “must show
that the BIA could plausibly have determined that [s]he was [eligible for relief]
based on the record before it.” Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 827 (9th
Cir. 2003); see also Singh, 367 F.3d at 1189. Nowhere—either before the BIA or
1 Domingo-Castillo was represented by counsel before the IJ. She made no claim
before the BIA that her counsel before the IJ was ineffective.

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on appeal to us—does Domingo-Castillo argue or present evidence showing that
she could have overcome the IJ’s abandonment determination, which was the basis
for her removal. Thus, there were no plausible grounds for relief, and the BIA did
not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen.
PETITION DENIED.

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