Mercedes Yaneth Hernandez- Sesente; Ronald Vladimir Barraza-Hernandez v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MERCEDES YANETH HERNANDEZ-
SESENTE; RONALD VLADIMIR
BARRAZA-HERNANDEZ,
Petitioners,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 22-1590
Agency Nos.
A206-690-652
A206-690-653
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 7, 2023**
Pasadena, California
Before: CALLAHAN, R. NELSON, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Mercedes Yaneth Hernandez-Sesente and her minor son, natives and citizens
of El Salvador, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 11 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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decision dismissing an appeal from the Immigration Judge’s denial of Hernandez-
Sesente’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention against Torture (“CAT”).1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252. We deny the petition for review.
1. The agency did not err in finding that Hernandez-Sesente’s proposed
particular social group of “vulnerable Salvadoran daughters in a domestic
relationship” was not cognizable. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th
Cir. 2016) (explaining that to demonstrate membership in a particular social group,
“[t]he applicant must ‘establish that the group is (1) composed of members who
share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and
(3) socially distinct within the society in question’” (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-,
26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014))).
We do not consider Hernandez-Sesente’s newly proposed particular social
group—“a single female child who was in a parent-child domestic relationship and
was a victim of domestic violence as a child from her natural mother,” who
“considered [Hernandez-Sesente] ‘property’”—because she did not present it to the
agency. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (exhaustion requirement); Santos-Zacaria v.
Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 417, 423 (2023) (explaining that the exhaustion
1 Hernandez-Sesente’s son was a derivative applicant on her application for
asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A).

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requirement is mandatory unless waived by the government).
Hernandez-Sesente’s failure to establish a cognizable social group is
dispositive of her asylum claim, and thus, we do not consider her other arguments.
See Reyes, 842 F.3d at 1132 n. 3. See Sarkar v. Garland, 39 F.4th 611, 622 (9th
Cir. 2022).
2. Substantial evidence supports the denial of CAT protection because
Hernandez-Sesente failed to show that it is more likely than not she would be
tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to El
Salvador. See Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009); 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1).
PETITION DENIED.

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