Broque Anthony Anderson v. R. OREWYLER, G6210, individual capacity

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BROQUE ANTHONY ANDERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
R. OREWYLER, G6210, individual capacity
and official capacity; MATA, Rancho
Cucamonga Sheriff, individual and official
capacity; R. WRIGHT, No. W2800,
individual and official capacity;
ESMERALDA CONTRERAS, Rancho
Cucamonga, individual and official capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 22-56125
D.C. No. 5:21-cv-02168-JAK-KES
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 10, 2023**
Before: S.R. THOMAS, McKEOWN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Broque Anthony Anderson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
OCT 18 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging unlawful search and seizure. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Wilhelm v.
Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A); Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 579 (9th Cir. 2007) (dismissal under
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)). We affirm.
To the extent that Anderson challenges the merits of the district court’s
dismissal, the district court properly dismissed Anderson’s action because
Anderson’s official capacity claims failed to allege facts sufficient to show that
defendants acted under an unconstitutional policy or custom; Anderson’s search
and seizure claims resulting in a conviction were Heck-barred; and Anderson
otherwise failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that, to avoid dismissal, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Heck,
512 U.S. at 487 (holding that if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence . . . the complaint
must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or
sentence has already been invalidated”); Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d
1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“In order to establish municipal liability, a
plaintiff must show that a ‘policy or custom’ led to the plaintiff’s injury.” (citation

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omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to stay Anderson’s
action to allow him to challenge his state court conviction. See Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 649 (1997);
Filtrol Corp. v. Kelleher, 467 F.2d 242, 245 (9th Cir. 1972) (setting forth standard
of review).
AFFIRMED.

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