Partap Singh v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PARTAP SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 21-958
Agency No.
A206-340-923
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 16, 2023**
San Francisco, California
Before: BEA, CHRISTEN, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Partap Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of
the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) order denying his time-barred motion
to reopen to apply for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
OCT 18 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the BIA’s denial of
a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983,
986 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny the petition.
1. The BIA denied Petitioner’s motion to reopen because it determined that
the motion was time-barred and that no exception to the timeliness requirement
applied because Petitioner failed to produce material evidence of changed country
conditions in India. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). To prevail on a motion to reopen
based on changed country conditions, a movant must produce previously
unavailable, material evidence of changed conditions in the country of removal,
and must demonstrate that the new evidence, considered together with the evidence
presented at the merits hearing below, would establish prima facie eligibility for
relief. Silva v. Garland, 993 F.3d 705, 718 (9th Cir. 2021).
2. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion to
reopen without considering evidence of changed conditions in India regarding the
persecution of Sikhs. Petitioner neither stated a fear of persecution on account of
his Sikh religion in his motion, nor submitted a religion-based application for relief
along with his motion. “A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of
submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate
application for relief and all supporting documentation.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1)
(emphasis added); see Shin v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008). The

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BIA did not err in not addressing a claim Petitioner did not properly raise.
3. The BIA, in denying Petitioner’s time-barred motion to reopen, properly
considered whether Petitioner’s new political affiliation, a change in his personal
circumstances, established a material change in country conditions.
4. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in characterizing Petitioner’s new
application for relief as arising from the same basis as his initial application.
Notwithstanding Petitioner’s observation that his “new claim was poorly
articulated in his motion to reopen,” the BIA’s characterization was not “arbitrary,
irrational, or contrary to law.” Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 678 (9th Cir.
2011) (quoting Ontiveros-Lopez v. I.N.S., 213 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000)).
5. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s time-barred
motion to reopen without evaluating whether Petitioner established prima facie
eligibility for relief. The BIA determined that Petitioner failed to produce material
evidence of changed country conditions in India. That determination gave the BIA
grounds to deny Petitioner’s motion. See, e.g., Lin v. Holder, 588 F.3d 981, 989
(9th Cir. 2009). It was unnecessary for the BIA to evaluate whether Petitioner
established prima facie eligibility for relief. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d
532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004).
PETITION DENIED.

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