Mario H. Castro Rodriguez v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARIO H. CASTRO RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 22-617
Agency No.
A095-006-823
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 5, 2023**
Las Vegas, Nevada
Before: RAWLINSON and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and PREGERSON,*** District
Judge.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Dean D. Pregerson, United States District Judge for
the Central District of California, sitting by designation.
FILED
OCT 11 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Petitioner Mario Castro Rodriguez (“Castro”), a native and citizen of El
Salvador, petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) adopting and affirming the immigration judge’s (“IJ’s”) order denying
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. As the parties are
familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. “Where, as here, the BIA
cites [Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994)] and also provides
its own review of the evidence and law, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s
decisions.” Cordoba v. Barr, 962 F.3d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 2020) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted). Reviewing the agency’s findings of fact for substantial
evidence, INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992), we deny the petition
for review.
1. To be eligible for asylum, an applicant must establish that he has suffered
persecution or has a well-founded fear of persecution “on account of” a protected
ground, which is also known as the “nexus” requirement. Baghdasaryan v.
Holder, 592 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010). Substantial evidence supports the
agency’s determination that Castro failed to show his eligibility for asylum due to
his inability to establish a nexus between his membership in the particular social
group of the Rodriguez family and any past or future persecution.
Here, Castro failed to provide evidence that he or his mother has suffered

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persecution because of their familial ties. Although Castro suffered an assault by
gang members in 1995, he admitted during his testimony that the assault occurred
because he refused to join their gang. While his mother, who still resides in El
Salvador, was extorted twice and had the title to her house stolen, there is no
evidence that these events took place because of her membership in the Rodriguez
family; further, Castro testified that the gangs were doing things like this with
everyone.1 See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that
“harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members
bears no nexus to a protected ground”).
2. Likewise, substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of
withholding of removal because Castro provided no evidence of nexus. See
Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 358, 360 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that the
nexus requirement for withholding of removal is less demanding than the nexus
requirement for asylum, but that where “there was no nexus at all,” there is “no
distinction between the ‘one central reason’ phrase in the asylum statute and the ‘a
reason’ phrase in the withholding statute”).
3. Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s finding that Castro was
1 Because substantial evidence supports the lack of nexus, we do not reach the
agency’s determination that Castro’s asylum application was time-barred, or the
government’s argument that this court should summarily dismiss because Castro
waived any challenge to the agency’s finding that he failed to show the Salvadoran
government was or would be unable or unwilling to protect him from persecution.

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not eligible for CAT protection. To qualify for CAT protection, the applicant must
“establish that it is more likely than not that he . . . would be tortured,” by or with
the acquiescence of the government, “if removed to the proposed country of
removal.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1). Additionally, the applicant
“must demonstrate that he would be subject to a ‘particularized threat of torture.’”
Dhital v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citation
omitted).
Here, Castro failed to compel the conclusion that he would be subjected to a
“particularized threat of torture” upon return to El Salvador. While he contends
that the country reports clearly illustrate that the Salvadoran government
acquiesces in the torture of people like himself, the agency also considered the
particular evidence that the Salvadoran police attempted to control the people who
were extorting his mother.
4. Finally, Castro’s argument that the BIA employed an incorrect standard
of review is unpersuasive. Because the BIA noted that it reviews the IJ’s findings
of fact for clear error, and then reviewed for clear error, the BIA applied the proper
standard of review. See Ridore v. Holder, 696 F.3d 907, 911, 919 (9th Cir. 2012);
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i).
The stay of removal will remain in place until the mandate issues.
PETITION DENIED.

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