GABRIEL ECKARD, AKA Gabriel Allen Eckard v. ALTA LANGDON, Health Services Administrator, Snohomish County Jail

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GABRIEL ECKARD, AKA Gabriel Allen
Eckard,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ALTA LANGDON, Health Services
Administrator, Snohomish County Jail;
JACOB TAYLOR, Mental Health
Professional Lead, Snohomish County Jail,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 21-35729
D.C. No. 2:19-cv-00579-JCC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 12, 2023**
Before: CANBY, CALLAHAN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Washington state prisoner Gabriel Eckard appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
SEP 19 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 4 --

2 21-35729
indifference to his serious medical needs while he was a pretrial detainee. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Sandoval v.
County of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2021). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Eckard failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants’ decision not to
provide him with the specific mental health care he requested was unreasonable
under the circumstances. See Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125
(9th Cir. 2018) (identifying elements of a pretrial detainee’s inadequate medical
care claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, including that “the defendant did not
take reasonable available measures to abate [the risk of suffering serious harm],
even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the
high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct
obvious”); see also Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099,
1102 (9th Cir. 2000) (summary judgment is appropriate where “the nonmoving
party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate
burden of persuasion at trial”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Eckard’s motions
for additional time to oppose defendants’ summary judgment motion and seeking
to extend the discovery deadline. See Midbrook Flowerbulbs Holland B.V. v.
Holland Am. Bulb Farms, Inc., 874 F.3d 604, 612, 619-20 (9th Cir. 2017) (setting

-- 2 of 4 --

3 21-35729
forth standard of review and explaining that to prevail on a Rule 56(d) request, a
party must state in an affidavit the specific facts it seeks in further discovery, and
show that such facts exist and are essential to oppose summary judgment); Johnson
v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir. 1992) (setting forth
standard of review and explaining that a district court has broad discretion to
manage its docket and a moving party must demonstrate “good cause” to modify a
pretrial scheduling order).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Eckard’s motion for
leave to amend his complaint. See Yakama Indian Nation v. State of Wash. Dep’t
of Revenue, 176 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999) (setting forth standard of review
and explaining that denial of leave to amend is warranted if amendment “would
cause prejudice to the opposing party . . . or creates undue delay”); see also
Chodos v. West Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (a district court’s
discretion is “particularly broad” where it has previously granted leave to amend).
To the extent Eckard sought to supplement his complaint, denial was not an abuse
of discretion because Eckard’s proposed filing sought to add numerous new
defendants and unrelated causes of action. See Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v.
Neely, 130 F.3d 400, 402 (9th Cir. 1997) (a supplemental pleading under Rule
15(d) “cannot be used to introduce a separate, distinct, and new cause of action”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

-- 3 of 4 --

4 21-35729
To the extent Eckard challenges the district court’s order denying his motion
for a preliminary injunction, the issue is moot because Eckard was transferred to a
different institution. See Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991)
(transfer to another facility moots inmate’s claim for injunctive relief absent
reasonable expectation of being transferred back).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Eckard’s request for a copy of the opening brief, set forth in the opening
brief, is granted. The Clerk will mail Eckard a copy of his opening brief received
at Docket Entry No. 16. All other pending motions and requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.

-- 4 of 4 --