Jessica Lundquist v. United States of America;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JESSICA LUNDQUIST,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 22-55709
D.C. No.
2:20-cv-04980-FMO-AS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Fernando M. Olguin, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 9, 2023
Pasadena, California
Before: GILMAN,** FORREST, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Jessica Lundquist appeals the district court’s dismissal of her state-law tort
claims against three Transportation Security Officers (TSOs). Lundquist alleges that
the TSOs falsely imprisoned her and committed trespass to chattels when they
required her to undergo a pat-down search at the Hollywood Burbank Airport and
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, United States Circuit Judge for
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
FILED
SEP 8 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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refused to let her record the search with her cell phone. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C § 1291. We review the district court’s decision under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo, and we affirm. See Ballinger v. City of Oakland, 24
F.4th 1287, 1292 (9th Cir. 2022).
1. Subject-matter jurisdiction. Under the law-enforcement proviso of the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), the United States has waived its sovereign
immunity for money damages claims arising “out of assault, battery, false
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, [or] abuse of process” committed
by “investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government.” 28
U.S.C. § 2680(h). The parties disputed whether TSOs fall within the scope of this
proviso. However, we recently held that TSOs do “fall within the ordinary meaning
of the proviso’s definition of investigative or law enforcement officers.” Leuthauser
v. United States, 71 F.4th 1189, 1199 (9th Cir. 2023). Accordingly, Lundquist’s
claims are not barred by sovereign immunity, and we have jurisdiction to consider
the merits of her claims.
2. False imprisonment. Under California law, false imprisonment
requires: “(1) the nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2) without
lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable period of time, however brief.” Young v.
County of Los Angeles, 655 F.3d 1156, 1169 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Easton v.
Sutter Coast Hosp., 80 Cal. App. 4th 485, 496 (2000)). Because TSOs are statutorily

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authorized to screen airline passengers and their property, Lundquist cannot show
that the TSOs were “without lawful privilege” to verbally confine her to the security
checkpoint area until her pat-down was complete. See United States v. Aukai, 497
F.3d 955, 960 n.3, 962–63 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (explaining that “[a]irport
screening searches are mandated by a federal law” under 49 U.S.C. § 44901 and
finding that an 18-minute detention at a checkpoint for a nonconsensual airport-
screening search was “constitutionally reasonable”); see also 49 C.F.R. § 1540.107
(prohibiting individuals from entering the sterile area of the airport without
submitting to screening and inspection by the Transportation Security
Administration).
3. Trespass to Chattels. Trespass to chattels occurs when “an intentional
interference with the possession of personal property has proximately caused
injury.” Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342, 1350–51 (2003) (citation omitted).
“A mere momentary or theoretical deprivation of use is not sufficient unless there is
a dispossession.” Id. at 1357 (citation omitted). Because Lundquist alleges only that
the TSOs interfered with her ability to use her cell phone, she must demonstrate that
the interference was “for a time so substantial that it is possible to estimate the loss
caused thereby.” Id. (citation omitted); see also id. (“Short of dispossession, personal
injury, or physical damage . . . , intermeddling is actionable only if ‘the chattel is
impaired as to its condition, quality, or value, or . . . the possessor is deprived of the

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use of the chattel for a substantial time.’” (citation omitted)). Accepting Lundquist’s
allegations as true, the interference with her phone was merely a “momentary . . .
deprivation” from when she first requested to record the search and the completion
of the pat-down. See id. Moreover, the TSOs were likely authorized to prevent
Lundquist from using her cell phone during this period because she had not yet
cleared the checkpoint, even though the cell phone had cleared screening. See
generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 265 (1965) (“One is privileged to commit
an act which would otherwise be a trespass to a chattel . . . if he is acting in discharge
of a duty or authority created by law to preserve the public safety . . . .”).1
AFFIRMED.
1Lundquist does not separately challenge the dismissal of her battery claim on
appeal, and we do not address it.

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