United States of America v. Felix Arroyo

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
FELIX ARROYO,
Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 22-10302
22-10303
D.C. Nos. 3:17-cr-00277-WHO-1
3:13-cr-00606-WHO-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
William H. Orrick, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 15, 2023**
Before: TASHIMA, S.R. THOMAS, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
In these consolidated appeals, Felix Arroyo appeals from the district court’s
judgment entered in both of his criminal cases imposing a single 24-month
sentence upon the second revocation of his supervised release. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
AUG 22 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 22-10302 & 22-10303
Arroyo contends that the district court failed to explain the sentence
adequately and relied on the impermissible sentencing factor of “just punishment.”
These claims fail.1 The court explained that an above-Guidelines sentence was
warranted because, despite the “enormous number of opportunities” provided to
Arroyo during his lengthy history before the court, he continued to violate the
terms of his supervised release in numerous ways. The court further indicated that
a sentence at the statutory maximum, with no supervision to follow, was
appropriate because supervision had not proven beneficial to Arroyo. This
explanation is sufficient to allow for meaningful appellate review and satisfies 18
U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2). See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008)
(en banc).
The court’s sentencing explanation also belies Arroyo’s claim that the court
impermissibly relied on a prohibited sentencing factor. Viewed in context of the
full revocation hearing, the court’s brief reference to “further punishment”
reflected its concern about finding an appropriate sanction for Arroyo’s repeated
breaches of the court’s trust, which is the primary purpose of a revocation
sentence. See United States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173, 1182 (9th Cir. 2006).
AFFIRMED.
1 We do not reach the parties’ dispute over the appropriate standard of review
because Arroyo’s claims fail under any standard.

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