Johanna M. Immelt v. Dee Sharp

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHANNA M. IMMELT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DEE SHARP, in her official capacity as
Program Director; TAMBRA MCCOWAN,
in her official capacity as Professional
Licensing Manager,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
STATE OF WASHINGTON
DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING REAL
ESTATE APPRAISER PROGRAM,
Defendant.
No. 22-35249
D.C. No. 3:20-cv-05617-BHS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 21, 2023**
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
AUG 21 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Before: O’SCANNLAIN, KLEINFELD, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Johanna Immelt appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in her action alleging due process violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo, see, e.g., Holz v. Nenana City Public School Dist.,
347 F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 2003), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment to the individual state
officials. Any claims against the officials, sued in their official capacities and
seeking money damages, were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Pennhurst
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984).
Any claims against the officials, sued in their official capacities and seeking
prospective injunctive relief, were also barred by the Eleventh Amendment,
because Immelt did not establish that the state regulations at issue were
unconstitutional, or otherwise conflicted with federal authority. Id.
The district court properly determined that the officials were entitled to
qualified immunity for any claims against them in their individual capacity,
because Immelt failed to establish a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (qualified immunity shields state officials from
money damages unless plaintiff shows, among other things, that the official
violated a constitutional right).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Immelt’s motion to

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reconsider, because Immelt failed to establish any colorable basis for
reconsideration. See, e.g., Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 940, 945 (9th Cir.
2003) (motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual
circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered
evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the
controlling law; it may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the
first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation).
AFFIRMED.

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