Kenneth Sachs v. Raymond E. Branton

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KENNETH SACHS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RAYMOND E. BRANTON,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 22-16437
D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00008-DLR
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 15, 2023**
Before: TASHIMA, S.R. THOMAS, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
Kenneth Sachs appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his
action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of state child custody
proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We may affirm on
any basis supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
AUG 21 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 22-16437
Cir. 2008). We affirm.
Dismissal of Sachs’s federal constitutional claim was proper because Sachs
failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Benavidez v. County of San
Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1146 (9th Cir. 2021) (setting forth requirements to state a
violation of a constitutional right to familial association through judicial
deception).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining supplemental
jurisdiction over Sachs’s remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)
(“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a
[state-law] claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it
has original jurisdiction.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying further leave to
amend because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of
review and explaining that leave to amend may be denied when amendment would
be futile).
We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See

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3 22-16437
Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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