Eurho Joe v. Supreme Court of California

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EURHO JOE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 22-16224
D.C. No. 5:22-cv-03155-SVK
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Susan G. Van Keulen, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted August 15, 2023***
Before: TASHIMA, S.R. THOMAS, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
Eurho Joe appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various claims arising out of his state court custody
proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
*** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
AUG 21 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Arrington v. Wong, 237
F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Joe’s action because his claims are
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777-
78 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars district
courts from exercising jurisdiction over actual or de facto appeals of state court
decisions).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Joe’s action
without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v.
Countrywide Home Loans, 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth
standard of review and explaining that a district court may deny leave to amend if
amendment would be futile).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Joe’s application
for entry of default because defendant filed a motion to dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 55 (a) (providing for entry of default when a defendant “has failed to plead or
otherwise defend”); Speiser, Krause & Madole P.C. v. Ortiz, 271 F.3d 884, 886
(9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth standard of review).
Joe’s request for default judgment, set forth in the reply brief, is denied.
AFFIRMED.

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