United States of America v. Juan Jose Sanchez, Aka Ghost

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JUAN JOSE SANCHEZ, AKA GHOST,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 22-30146
D.C. No. 1:21-cr-00146-BLW-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
B. Lynn Winmill, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 18, 2023**
Before: SCHROEDER, RAWLINSON, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Juan Jose Sanchez appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges
the sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for unlawful possession
of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
AUG 4 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 22-30146
Sanchez argues the district court erred by imposing a below-Guidelines fine
to be paid according to a set schedule. We review for plain error, see United States
v. Hernandez-Arias, 757 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2014), and conclude there is none.
Sanchez fails to demonstrate a present or future inability to comply with the
payment schedule set by the district court. See United States v. Haggard, 41 F.3d
1320, 1329 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that “[a] court may fine a presently
indigent defendant if it finds that the defendant has sufficient earning capacity to
pay the fine in the future” and affirming where the defendant “made no showing of
future inability to pay”).
Sanchez also challenges his custodial term and contends that the district
court should have treated his prior juvenile conviction as a reflection of his
difficult and traumatic background, rather than an aggravating factor. The record
does not support his contention. The court only briefly mentioned his prior
juvenile conviction when discussing Sanchez’s lengthy criminal history and
expressly considered his difficult background as a mitigating factor. The court’s
treatment of his juvenile offense was not an abuse of discretion. See Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The 96-month term is substantively reasonable
under the totality of the circumstances and in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors, including the need to protect the public. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
AFFIRMED.

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