Bryan Damon Patterson v. California Department of Corrections

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRYAN DAMON PATTERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION;
UNION SUPPLY DIRECT;
WALKENHORST, Vendor; ACCESS
SECURE PAK,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 22-16512
D.C. No. 1:22-cv-00138-JLT-BAM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Jennifer L. Thurston, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 18, 2023**
Before: SCHROEDER, RAWLINSON, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Bryan Damon Patterson appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
AUG 4 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”).
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district
court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447
(9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Patterson’s First Amendment free
exercise and RLUIPA claims because Patterson failed to allege facts sufficient to
establish that defendants’ actions placed a substantial burden on his religious
exercise. See Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031-32 (9th Cir. 2015) (under the
Free Exercise Clause, a substantial burden “must have a tendency to coerce
individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs or exert substantial
pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 889 (9th
Cir. 2008) (under RLUIPA, a burden is substantial if a prison “intentionally puts
significant pressure on inmates . . . to abandon their religious beliefs” (alteration in
original, citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Patterson’s Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection claim because Patterson failed to allege facts sufficient to show
that any defendant intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of his
religion. See Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123
(9th Cir. 2013) (requirements for an equal protection claim).

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The district court properly dismissed Patterson’s Eighth Amendment claim
because Patterson failed to allege facts sufficient to show deliberate indifference.
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (requirements for an Eighth
Amendment violation in the prison context).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying further leave to
amend because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of
review and explaining that leave to amend may be denied when amendment would
be futile); Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1072 (9th
Cir. 2008) (explaining that “the district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is
particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Patterson’s motion for court response and docket sheet (Docket Entry No. 7)
is denied as moot.
AFFIRMED.

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