United States of America v. Manuel Vasquez-Perez

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MANUEL VASQUEZ-PEREZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 22-50032
D.C. No.
3:20-cr-03445-LAB-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 21, 2023
Pasadena, California
Before: S.R. THOMAS, NGUYEN, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
Manuel Vasquez-Perez appeals his conviction and sentence for illegal
reentry, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)–(b). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Reviewing de novo whether the jury’s exposure to extrinsic evidence violated
Vasquez’s Sixth Amendment rights, see United States v. Saya, 247 F.3d 929, 937
(9th Cir. 2001), we reverse and remand.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED
JUL 27 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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When, during deliberations, the jury considers evidence that was not
presented at trial, the defendant “has effectively lost the rights of confrontation,
cross-examination, and the assistance of counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment. Gibson v. Clanon, 633 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1980). In such
circumstances, the defendant is entitled to a new trial unless the government
“show[s] beyond a reasonable doubt that the extrinsic evidence did not affect the
verdict.” United States v. Navarro-Garcia, 926 F.2d 818, 821 (9th Cir. 1991).
Here, the district court violated Vasquez’s Sixth Amendment rights by
allowing the jury to view his neck tattoo for the first time during deliberations.1
Unlike in United States v. Rincon, the court did not “limit the display to evidence
presented at trial.” 28 F.3d 921, 927 (9th Cir. 1994). In Rincon, the district court
“properly” rejected the jury’s request to see the defendant wearing sunglasses,
which “were extrinsic evidence” because he had not worn them at trial. Id.
The government argues that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt because the tattoo evidence was duplicative of other evidence proving
1 We disagree with the government that the district court effectively
“reopen[ed]” the proceedings “to admit new evidence.” But even accepting that
characterization for the sake of argument, the district court abused its discretion.
See Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008) (“[W]e follow the
principle of party presentation. That is, we rely on the parties to frame the issues
for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties
present.”); see also United States v. Hernandez-Meza, 720 F.3d 760, 765 (9th Cir.
2013) (“No competent prosecutor would be surprised . . . to find defense counsel
poking holes in the government’s case.”).

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Vasquez’s identity. We disagree. The jury had reason to doubt the government’s
evidence. There were inconsistencies in the evidence about the clothing and
appearance of the man who the government argued was Vasquez. That the jury
specifically requested the extrinsic evidence and considered it for the final hour of
its roughly 90-minute deliberations weighs in favor of finding prejudice. See
Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1988); Gibson, 633 F.2d at 855.
The government also suggests that any error was harmless because “the jury
learned the . . . information in open court, subject to full judicial oversight,” but
that fact only increases the prejudice. Typically when jurors consider extrinsic
evidence, they have been instructed not to do so; here, the court expressly
sanctioned reliance on extrinsic evidence. See Dickson, 849 F.2d at 406
(considering “how” the jury receives the extrinsic evidence in determining
prejudice); cf. United States v. Bagley, 641 F.2d 1235, 1241 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[Pre-
verdict curative] instructions are generally deemed sufficient as curative of
prejudicial impact.”). Vasquez is entitled to a new trial.
Vasquez’s remaining contentions lack merit. There is no evidence the
district court acted with bias, the court did not plainly err by using jury instructions
and a verdict form substantially similar to those in United States v. Singh, 532 F.3d
1053, 1062–63 (9th Cir. 2008), and Vasquez has not shown that the illegal reentry

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statute violates equal protection, see United States v. Carrillo-Lopez, 68 F.4th
1133, 1142–54 (9th Cir. 2023).
REVERSED and REMANDED.

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