Catarina De Leon Geronimo; Emily Josefin De Leon; Jens Oliver Francisco De Leon v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CATARINA DE LEON
GERONIMO; EMILY JOSEFIN DE
LEON; JENS OLIVER FRANCISCO DE
LEON,
Petitioners,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 21-1153
Agency Nos.
A209-870-448
A209-870-486
A209-870-449
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 26, 2023**
Pasadena, California
Before: N.R. SMITH, LEE, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
Petitioners Catarina De Leon Geronimo and her two minor children,
E.J.D.L. and J.O.F.D.L., seek review of an order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) affirming the denial of their applications for asylum, withholding
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUN 28 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).
Petitioners assert that if they are removed to Guatemala, they will be persecuted
and tortured because of their indigenous heritage.
The BIA held that petitioners’ asylum and withholding-of-removal claims
failed for lack of a nexus to a particular social group, and that their CAT claims
failed because they did not show that it is more likely than not that they would be
tortured if removed to Guatemala. We review legal questions de novo, and the
agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence. Singh v. Garland, 48 F.4th
1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2022). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we
deny the petition for review.
1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of petitioners’ asylum
and withholding-of-removal claims. An applicant for asylum or withholding of
removal must demonstrate a nexus between the persecution she suffered or fears
and a protected ground. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 356–58 (9th
Cir. 2017); Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2021).
Specifically, an asylum applicant must show that the protected ground is “one
central reason” for her persecution. Barajas-Romero, 846 F.3d at 358; 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Meanwhile, the nexus standard for withholding of removal
is “less demanding,” requiring the applicant to show only that the protected
ground is “a reason” for her persecution. Barajas-Romero, 846 F.3d at 360; 8
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C).
Petitioners contend that they suffered harm that rises to the level of

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persecution because of their indigenous heritage when, sometime between 2014
and 2016, their neighbors destroyed their coffee plants and cut off access to their
home’s electricity and water supply. And they argue that they experienced
persecution again in 2016, after they had moved to another town approximately
four hours away, when they received two separate threatening letters demanding
that they pay money or be killed.
But the record is devoid of any evidence to support the conclusion that
petitioners were harmed or threatened because of their indigenous heritage.
Indeed, De Leon Geronimo’s own testimony indicated that the neighbors likely
tried to harm their coffee plants because they were “jealous,” and “didn’t like that
[her partner] had [a] good harvest.” And as to the threats, she never testified or
indicated that she thought that the criminals targeted her and her children for their
indigenous heritage as opposed to their desire for money.
Substantial evidence thus supports the BIA’s conclusion that there was no
nexus between the harm petitioners suffered and petitioners’ indigenous heritage.
The BIA did not err in finding that the neighbors’ motive for destroying the coffee
plants and cutting off access to electricity and water was either jealousy over their
successful planting season or pecuniary gain. Either way, it was unrelated to
petitioners’ indigenous heritage. See Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 506 (9th
Cir. 2013) (noting that “mistreatment motivated purely by personal retribution
will not give rise to a valid asylum claim”). And substantial evidence supports
the BIA’s conclusion that the two threatening extortion letters petitioners

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received in 2016 were not connected to petitioners’ indigenous heritage. See
Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that an
applicant’s “desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or
random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground”).
In addition, because petitioners’ family in Guatemala has remained in the
same house and has not experienced any harm, the BIA did not err in concluding
that petitioners failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. See
Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1094–95 (9th Cir. 2010).
2. The procedural requirements of Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir.
2011) do not apply to this case. Petitioners now argue for the first time that the
Immigration Judge (IJ) erred by not following Ren. Id. at 1090. But not only is
that argument unexhausted and thus not properly before this court, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(d)(1), Ren is inapposite here. Ren applies in cases where the IJ requires
corroborative evidence to supplement an applicant’s credible testimony and to
establish eligibility for relief. See Ren, 648 F.3d at 1090; see also Fon v. Garland,
34 F.4th 810, 816 (9th Cir. 2022). Here, the IJ did not deny petitioners’ claims
based on a failure to corroborate De Leon Geronimo’s testimony, nor did she
request that any additional corroborative evidence be presented.
3. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s denial of petitioners’ CAT
claims. Under CAT, petitioners bear the burden of proving that they will more
likely than not be tortured if they are removed to Guatemala. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.16(c)(2). Thus, they must demonstrate that they “would be subject to a

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particularized threat of torture, and that such torture would be inflicted by or at
the instigation of or with the consent of a public official or other person acting in
official capacity.” Lalayan v. Garland, 4 F.4th 822, 840 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned
up).
Petitioners contend that the BIA erred in denying them CAT protection
because it failed to consider country-conditions evidence, which they assert
establishes “the Guatemalan government’s failure to protect indigenous people
from torture.” But the question of whether the Guatemalan government would
consent or acquiesce to petitioners’ torture is separate from the question of
whether petitioners established a particularized threat of future torture in the first
place. See Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1033 (9th Cir. 2014)
(explaining that CAT “requires a two part analysis”—first, whether there is a
likelihood of future torture; and second, whether there is “sufficient state action
involved in that torture” (cleaned up)). The BIA expressly declined to reach the
issue of government acquiescence, and thus that issue is not before this court. See
INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and
agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is
unnecessary to the results they reach.”). And substantial evidence supports the
BIA’s dispositive conclusion that petitioners failed to establish a clear probability
of future torture, as their family has remained in Guatemala unharmed. See
Tamang, 598 F.3d at 1094–95.
PETITION DENIED.

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