Ramiro Chacon-Morales v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAMIRO CHACON-MORALES,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 21-1200
Agency No.
A206-547-525
ORDER AMENDING
MEMORANDUM DISPOSITION
Before: RAWLINSON, BEA, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.
The Unopposed Motion to Amend filed by Respondent on June 15, 2023,
is GRANTED. The memorandum disposition filed on May 2, 2023, is hereby
amended as follows:
The final sentence of the memorandum disposition is amended to read:
We remand to the BIA with instructions to vacate the IJ’s decision granting
reconsideration and to remand the matter to the IJ with instructions to enter a
new order granting Chacon-Morales’s application for cancellation of removal.
FILED
JUN 27 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAMIRO CHACON-MORALES,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 21-1200
Agency No.
A206-547-525
AMENDED
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted April 21, 2023
Portland, Oregon
Before: RAWLINSON, BEA, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.
Ramiro Chacon-Morales (Chacon-Morales), a native and citizen of
Mexico, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision
dismissing his appeal of the granting of a motion to reconsider.
We review “rulings on motions to . . . reconsider for abuse of discretion
and reverse only if the Board acted arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law.”
Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED
JUN 27 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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A motion to reconsider must “show how a change in law materially affects [a]
prior decision.” In re O-S-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 56, 58 (BIA 2006). “A motion to
reconsider based on a legal argument that could have been raised in the earlier
proceedings will be denied. . . .” Id. (citation omitted).
1. At the time of Chacon-Morales’s individual hearing, the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) did “not dispute that [Chacon-Morales] . . . does
not have any disqualifying criminal offense” and “agreed to narrow the issues”
to the hardship and discretionary relief prongs of the cancellation of removal
inquiry. We decline to disturb the agency’s characterization of the
government’s position as a stipulation because the government did not
challenge the existence of a stipulation before the BIA. See Aguilar-Turcios v
Holder, 740 F.3d 1294, 1302 n.11 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The government must
accept the consequences of its litigation strategies, as must any defendant.”)
(citation omitted).
2. In its Motion to Reconsider, DHS cited the Board’s decision in Matter
of Obshatko, 27 I. & N. Dec. 173 (BIA 2017), as a change in law that justified
reconsideration. However, DHS failed to adequately explain how Obshatko
“materially affect[ed]” the IJ’s decision. O-S-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 58. Nor
did DHS explain how Obshatko gave rise to a legal argument that DHS could
not have raised earlier in the proceedings, especially when neither party
presented new evidence following the decision of the Immigration Judge (IJ)
granting the motion to reconsider. See id. The IJ therefore abused its discretion

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in granting the motion. See Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 791.
In view of our conclusion that the motion to reconsider was
improvidently granted, we do not reach Chacon-Morales’s other arguments.
We remand to the BIA with instructions to vacate the IJ’s decision granting
reconsideration and to remand the matter to the IJ with instructions to enter a
new order granting Chacon-Morales’s application for cancellation of removal.
PETITION GRANTED.

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