BENJAMIN WOODHOUSE, A Citizen of the United States, Resident of the U.S. Virgin Islands v. United States Government;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BENJAMIN WOODHOUSE, A Citizen of
the United States, Resident of the U.S. Virgin
Islands,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 22-55636
D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00285-CAS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 16, 2023**
Before: BENNETT, MILLER, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
Benjamin Woodhouse appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action under a prefiling vexatious litigant order and for failure to
state a claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAY 23 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 22-55636
abuse of discretion a dismissal under a prefiling vexatious litigant order, In re
Fillbach, 223 F.3d 1089, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 2000), and de novo a dismissal under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th
Cir. 2010). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Woodhouse’s
claims against Nike, Inc., Meta Platforms, Inc., and Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher,
LLP because Woodhouse’s complaint was within the scope of the district court’s
prefiling vexatious litigant orders, and Woodhouse failed to comply with the pre-
filing requirements. See Weissman v. Quail Lodge, Inc., 179 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th
Cir. 1999) (“District courts have the inherent power to file restrictive pre-filing
orders against vexatious litigants with abusive and lengthy histories of litigation.
Such pre-filing orders may enjoin the litigant from filing further actions or papers
unless he or she first meets certain requirements . . . .” (citation omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Woodhouse’s claims against Alphabet,
Inc. because Woodhouse failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible
claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 681 (2009) (a claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content allowing the reasonable
inference that a defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged; conclusory
allegations are not entitled to the presumption of truth); United Bhd. of Carpenters
& Joiners of Am. v. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t, AFL-CIO, 770 F.3d 834, 837

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(9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth elements of a claim under the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act); Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474
(9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that there is no private right of action for obstruction of
justice), overruled in part on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693
F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Woodhouse’s motion to take judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 19) is denied.
All pending requests in the briefing are denied.
AFFIRMED.

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