Darrin Espinosa v. Contra Costa County

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DARRIN ESPINOSA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CONTRA COSTA COUNTY,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 22-15130
D.C. No. 4:19-cv-08055-JSW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 16, 2023**
Before: BENNETT, MILLER, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
Darrin Espinosa appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in his employment action alleging disability discrimination under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the California Fair Employment and Housing
Act (“FEHA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAY 23 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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novo. Shelley v. Geren, 666 F.3d 599, 604 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Espinosa’s
discrimination claims because Espinosa failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether he was capable of performing the essential functions of
the job with or without reasonable accommodation. See Dep’t of Fair Emp’t &
Hous. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 642 F.3d 728, 745 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The FEHA
prohibits discrimination against any person with a disability but, like the ADA,
provides that the law allows the employer to discharge an employee with a
physical disability when that employee is unable to perform the essential duties of
the job even with reasonable accommodation.”); Dark v. Curry County, 451 F.3d
1078, 1089 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The ADA does not require an employer to exempt an
employee from performing essential functions or to reallocate essential functions
to other employees.”); see also Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1188
(9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that employer was under no affirmative obligation to
provide an accommodation for employee who never requested an accommodation).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2009).
We treat Espinosa’s motions (Docket Entry No. 14) as motions to

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supplement the record on appeal and deny the motions.
AFFIRMED.

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