John David Pamplin v. C. LUCAS, R/N CN III, AKA Candis Rambur;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHN DAVID PAMPLIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
C. LUCAS, R/N CN III, AKA Candis
Rambur; et al.,
Defendant-Appellees.
No. 22-15284
D.C. No. 3:20-cv-00111-CLB
U.S. District Court for Nevada,
Reno
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Carla Baldwin, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 21, 2023
San Francisco, California
Before: SCHROEDER, CALLAHAN and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
John David Pamplin, an inmate with the Nevada Department of Corrections
(NDOC), appeals the district court’s dismissal of his disability discrimination
claim under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Pamplin
alleges that prison officials violated the ADA when they assigned him to a housing
unit on a hill that exacerbated his physical disabilities and then initially denied his
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED
MAY 16 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 7 --

2
requests to be transferred to another unit. Five months after Pamplin’s first
request, NDOC transferred him to a different facility and provided him with
medical devices to alleviate his physical disabilities. Pamplin subsequently filed a
pro se lawsuit in the District of Nevada seeking damages against the prison’s
“Administration,” the “Offender Management Division” of NDOC (OMD),
WSCC’s Associate Warden Ron Schreckengost, and two nurses, alleging
violations of the Eighth Amendment and the ADA.
When the district court screened Pamplin’s complaint, it dismissed his ADA
claim without prejudice as to all defendants except the two nurses. The district
court also dismissed Pamplin’s Eighth Amendment claim against OMD with
prejudice, and against the associate warden and the “Administration” without
prejudice but allowed the claim to proceed against the nurses. After discovery, the
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the nurses holding that they
were not deliberately indifferent to Pamplin’s medical needs under the Eighth
Amendment and that Pamplin’s requests were requests for treatment that fell
outside the scope of the ADA.
Pamplin, now represented by counsel, appeals from the final judgment
arguing that the district court erred in dismissing his ADA claim against the
“Administration” and OMD in its screening order and erred in dismissing on
summary judgment his ADA claim against the nurses as claims for medical

-- 2 of 7 --

3
treatment outside the scope of the ADA. Pamplin does not challenge the dismissal
of his Eighth Amendment claim. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291, and we vacate and remand.
When a district court dismisses a pro se prisoner’s complaint in the context
of the screening process required under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A, we review the
dismissal de novo, “construing the pro se complaint liberally and taking all the
allegations of material fact as true and in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff].”
Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 845 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2017);
Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). An order granting
summary judgment may be affirmed only if “‘there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact’ when viewing the record in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, such that the moving party ‘is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322–23 (1986)). Nonetheless, we “can affirm on any ground supported by the
record, even when the district court did not address that same ground.” Simmons v.
G. Arnett, 47 F.4th 927, 932 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal citations omitted).
1. The district court erred in dismissing Pamplin’s ADA claim against
the “Administration” and OMD. Pro se pleadings from inmates must be liberally
construed. United States v. Qazi, 975 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2020). Even when a
pro se plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim, a district court nonetheless must

-- 3 of 7 --

4
give the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint unless it is absolutely clear that
amendment would not cure the complaint’s deficiencies. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d
1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). The district court must also provide the pro se plaintiff
with notice of the complaint’s deficiencies to help ensure that the plaintiff can
amend it effectively. Id.; see also Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448–49 (9th
Cir. 1987), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203
F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000).
Here, Pamplin attempted to state a claim against NDOC and its employees.
The district court failed to appreciate that Pamplin’s complaint, although using
imprecise terms such as “Administration” and “OMD,” sought to state a claim
against NDOC. Also, the court erred to the extent it suggested that the state and
NDOC could not be sued under Title II. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S.
151, 159 (2006); see also Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1021
(9th Cir. 2010) overruled in part on other grounds by Castro v. County of Los
Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016). Furthermore, the district court failed to
clearly give Pamplin leave to amend or to adequately explain how the complaint
was deficient. The district court only stated in a footnote that, if Pamplin wanted
to sue the “Administration,” he must, “at the proper time, move to amend the
complaint . . .”

-- 4 of 7 --

5
Accordingly, the district court erred in failing to liberally construe Pamplin’s
complaint and in dismissing the ADA claim against OMD and the
“Administration” without providing a sufficient explanation of the complaint’s
deficiencies and clearly informing Pamplin that he could amend the complaint.
2. The district court also erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
the nurses on the basis that Pamplin’s request was for medical treatment, and thus
fell outside of the scope of the ADA. In Simmons v. Navajo County, we held that
“[t]he ADA prohibits discrimination because of disability, not inadequate
treatment for disability.” 609 F.3d at 1022. The district court found that, because
Pamplin used the words “treated,” “treatment,” and “medical” throughout his
requests, his allegation against the nurses was that they denied him adequate
medical treatment. Liberally construed, Pamplin’s allegation is not that he was
denied adequate medical treatment, but rather that he was denied a transfer to a flat
yard housing unit to accommodate his physical disabilities. But even assuming
that Pamplin’s complaint requested both transfer and treatment, it should not be
treated as only a request for medical treatment. See id. at 1021-22.
3. Finally, we cannot affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for the nurses on Pamplin’s ADA claim on any alternative ground. In
Simmons v. Navajo County, we held that, to state a claim under Title II of the
ADA, a plaintiff must allege:

-- 5 of 7 --

6
(1) he is an individual with a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified to
participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity’s services,
programs, or activities; (3) he was either excluded from participation
in or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services, programs, or
activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity;
and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by
reason of [his] disability.
Id. (quoting McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). A plaintiff bringing a Title II claim for
compensatory damages must prove that the public entity was deliberately
indifferent to his need for accommodation. Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d
1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Updike v. Multnomah County, 870 F.3d 939,
951 (9th Cir. 2017). This deliberate indifference standard requires a showing that
(1) the public entity had knowledge of the plaintiff’s potential need for an
accommodation, and (2) that the public entity, despite that knowledge, failed to
“undertake a fact-specific investigation to determine what constitute[d] a
reasonable accommodation” for that plaintiff. Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139. A failure
to act “must be a result of conduct that is more than negligent []and involves an
element of deliberateness.” Id.
Although the district court did not meaningfully address deliberate
indifference under the ADA, the nurses argue that the record shows they were not
deliberately indifferent and that we should affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment on this basis. However, a grant of summary judgment can be

-- 6 of 7 --

7
affirmed only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact when viewing
the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, such that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Simmons v. G. Arnett, 47 F.4th at
932 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Here, there appears to be a genuine
dispute of material fact regarding the ability of the nurses to grant Pamplin some
relief, or at least to process his complaints so that NDOC could provide Pamplin
with reasonable accommodation.
In sum, we vacate the dismissal of Pamplin’s claims under the ADA against
the NDOC and remand to allow him to file an amended complaint. We vacate the
grant of summary judgment for the nurses because Pamplin’s claim was for
accommodation under the ADA and not for medical treatment. Finally, we
conclude that on this record there appears to be a genuine issue of material fact as
to the nurses’ ability to process Pamplin’s complaint or grant him some relief.1
The district court’s orders are VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED.
1 We express no opinion as to the merits of Pamplin’s underlying claim.

-- 7 of 7 --