Rosa Gloria Cabrera Calderon, Juan Alexander Jimenez Cabrera v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROSA GLORIA CABRERA
CALDERON, JUAN ALEXANDER
JIMENEZ CABRERA,
Petitioners,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 22-1054
Agency Nos. A208-599-355
A208-599-356
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 17, 2023**
Portland, Oregon
Before: RAWLINSON, BEA and SUNG, Circuit Judges.
FILED
APR 19 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Rosa Gloria Cabrera Calderon (Calderon) and her minor son, natives and
citizens of Mexico, petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) dismissing their appeal of the denial by an Immigration Judge (IJ)
of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against
Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we deny the
petition.
When the BIA cites Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994),
adopting the IJ’s decision, and also provides its own reasoning, we review both the
IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions. See Ruiz-Colmenares v.Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748
(9th Cir. 2022). We review for substantial evidence the agency’s determination
that a petitioner has failed to establish eligibility for asylum, withholding of
removal, or CAT relief. See Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831 (9th
Cir. 2022), as amended. To prevail under this standard, “the petitioner must show
that the evidence not only supports, but compels the conclusion that these findings
and decisions are erroneous.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Petitioners
failed to establish past persecution. We have held that “[v]iolence against family
members . . . may support an applicant’s asylum claim.” Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383
F.3d 1112, 1120 (9th Cir. 2004), as amended (citations omitted). Nevertheless,
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violence against family members “must be part of a pattern of persecution closely
tied to the petitioner.” Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1062 (9th Cir. 2021)
(citations, alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). The record fails to
compel the conclusion that the harm Calderon’s family endured was closely tied to
Petitioners. See id.
2. Substantial evidence also supports the conclusion that Petitioners
failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution because they could
have relocated to another part of Mexico. See Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d
1025, 1029 (9th Cir. 2019). Calderon testified that she had family in Tijuana and
“maybe” she could live there. And she acknowledged that her mother and sisters
have lived without incident in Uruapan for several years.
3. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Petitioners were not
persecuted on account of membership in their family. See Zetino v. Holder, 622
F.3d 1007, 1015-1016 (9th Cir. 2010), as amended. Petitioners failed to establish
that family membership “was at least one central reason” they were persecuted. Id.
at 1015.
4. The determination that Petitioners failed to demonstrate they are
members of the particular social group of landowners is supported by substantial
evidence. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1132 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2016)
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(discussing membership in a particular social group). Similarly, substantial
evidence supports the determination that Petitioners failed to establish that they
held an anti-gang political opinion. See Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738,
747 (9th Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder,
707 F.3d 1081, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (discussing lack of evidence to
establish anti-gang political opinion).
5. Generally, an applicant who fails to establish eligibility for asylum
necessarily fails to qualify for withholding of removal. See Sarkar v. Garland, 39
F.4th 611, 622 (9th Cir. 2022). However, we recently clarified that the “a reason”
nexus standard for withholding of removal is less demanding than the “one central
reason” nexus standard for asylum. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 360
(9th Cir. 2017). The agency must apply the proper nexus standard in deciding
asylum and withholding of removal claims. See id. at 357-60. Here, the BIA cited
Barajas-Romero and explicitly referenced the correct nexus standards when
denying each requested relief.
6. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s denial of CAT relief because
Petitioners failed to demonstrate that they would more likely than not be tortured
with the acquiescence or consent of a public official. See B.R. v. Garland, 26 F.4th
827, 845 (9th Cir. 2022). “Generalized evidence of violence in a country is itself
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insufficient to establish that anyone in the government would acquiesce to a
petitioner’s torture.” Id. (citation omitted).
PETITION DENIED.
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