United States of America v. KEVIN NEAL CROWNOVER, AKA Kevin Crownover

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
KEVIN NEAL CROWNOVER, AKA Kevin
Crownover,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 22-10135
D.C. No.
1:19-cr-00018-DAD-BAM-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 10, 2023**
San Francisco, California
Before: PAEZ, CLIFTON, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Kevin Neal Crownover appeals the district court’s denial of his Rule 29
motion for judgment of acquittal. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 12 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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We review de novo the denial of a Rule 29 motion for a judgment of
acquittal. United States v. Gagarin, 950 F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir. 2020). In deciding
a defendant’s Rule 29 motion, the district court “must enter a judgment of acquittal
of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Fed.
R. Crim. P. 29(a). To decide whether the evidence was insufficient, we consider
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Crownover committed the
offense of aggravated identity theft. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1); Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The evidence at trial established that: (1) as
treasurer of a local lodge of the International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, Crownover had sole possession of the lodge’s checkbook; (2)
Crownover and lodge president James Hernandez were the only signatories on the
lodge’s bank account and protocol required that they both sign each check; (3) the
sole signature on check #103, which was made out to Crownover, appeared to
include a J and an H; (4) Hernandez did not sign check #103 or any other checks
made out to Crownover; (5) Hernandez did not sign any blank checks; and (6)

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check #103 was deposited into Crownover’s personal account. This evidence was
sufficient for any rational trier of fact to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Crownover knowingly used Hernandez’s signature without lawful authority on
check #103. See Gagarin, 950 F.3d at 602; United States v. Blixt, 548 F.3d 882,
887–88 (9th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, we do not address Crownover’s argument
that the jury should not have been permitted to make handwriting comparisons
under the circumstances presented here.
Because we affirm the district court’s denial of Crownover’s Rule 29
motion, we decline to vacate Crownover’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.

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