Phillip Camillo-Amisano v. Federal Bureau of Prisons;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PHILLIP CAMILLO-AMISANO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS; et
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 20-55038
D.C. No.
2:17-cv-06634-ODW-JDE
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Otis D. Wright II, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 16, 2023
Pasadena, California
Before: PAEZ, CHRISTEN, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Phillip Camillo-Amisano appeals the district court’s
order dismissing with prejudice his pro se complaint alleging several constitutional
claims against Bureau of Prison (BOP) employees and seeking damages pursuant
to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
FILED
MAR 28 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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U.S. 388 (1971). Because the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, we do
not recite them here. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s order dismissing a prisoner’s complaint
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Mangiaracina v. Penzone, 849 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th
Cir. 2017). Dismissal pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard
applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012).
But pro se complaints are construed liberally and may be dismissed only “if it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim that would entitle him to relief.” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th
Cir. 2014) (quoting Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012)).
We affirm the district court’s ruling that Camillo-Amisano’s complaint fails
to state a claim because he seeks only damages, and a Bivens claim is unavailable
for the harms alleged in his complaint. Because Camillo-Amisano concedes that
his claims present new Bivens contexts, the issue on appeal is whether there are any
“special factors” indicating that the judiciary “is at least arguably less equipped
than Congress to ‘weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to
proceed.’” Egbert v. Boule, 142 S. Ct. 1793, 1803 (2022) (quoting Ziglar v.
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Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 136 (2017)). Though the complaint alleges reprehensible
conduct, the Supreme Court’s decision in Egbert v. Boule establishes that at least
one “special factor” forecloses a Bivens claim here: the BOP’s Administrative
Remedy Program provided Camillo-Amisano access to an alternative remedial
structure for each of his claims. See 142 S. Ct. at 1804, 1806–07; 28 C.F.R. §§
542.10, 542.15. Through that program, Camillo-Amisano could seek “formal
review of an issue relating to any aspect of his[] own confinement,” 28 C.F.R. §
542.10(a), and bypass individual officers by filing grievances directly with the
Regional Director if he feared retaliation, id. § 542.14(d). In Egbert, the Supreme
Court stated that “a court may not fashion a Bivens remedy if Congress already has
provided, or has authorized the Executive to provide, ‘an alternative remedial
structure.’” 142 S. Ct. at 1804 (quoting Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 137). If such a
structure is in place, “‘that alone,’ like any special factor, is reason enough to ‘limit
the power of the Judiciary to infer a new Bivens cause of action.’” Id. (quoting
Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 137); see also Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74
(2001).
Camillo-Amisano argues the Administrative Remedy Program is inadequate
because it does not provide for damages and BOP employees interfered with his
ability to use it, but an alternative remedial structure forecloses a Bivens claim even
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if it “do[es] not provide complete relief.” Egbert, 142 S. Ct. at 1804 (quoting Bush
v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983)). In Egbert, the Supreme Court emphasized
that “[s]o long as Congress or the Executive has created a remedial process that it
finds sufficient to secure an adequate level of deterrence, the courts cannot second-
guess that calibration.” Id. at 1807. “[T]he question whether a given remedy is
adequate is a legislative determination that must be left to Congress, not the federal
courts.” Id. We therefore hold the district court correctly determined that the
Administrative Remedy Program foreclosed recognizing a Bivens claim for any of
Camillo-Amisano’s allegations.
AFFIRMED.
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