Peter Angelo Alden v. Aecom Technology Corporation, a Delaware corporation

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PETER ANGELO ALDEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
AECOM TECHNOLOGY
CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation;
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND
SPACE ADMINISTRATION, NASA, a
Federal Agency,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 21-16002
D.C. No. 5:18-cv-03258-SVK
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Susan G. Van Keulen, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 16, 2023**
Before: WALLACE, FERNANDEZ, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges
FILED
MAR 17 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Peter Alden appeals from the district court’s judgment in favor of the
defendants in his action claiming that his former employer, AECOM, fired him in
violation of the Defense Contractor Whistleblower Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. §
2409 (2008).1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2 We review the
district court’s interpretation of the statute and grant of summary judgment de
novo. Avery v. First Resol. Mgmt. Corp., 568 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 2009).
We affirm.
Summary judgment was proper for AECOM because the plain language of
the statute only protected NASA contractor employees who reported what they
reasonably believed to be “a substantial and specific danger to public health or
safety.” 10 U.S.C. § 2409(a) (2008). Protection for other reports, including
contract mismanagement, was limited to Department of Defense contracts, grants,
or funds. See id. (protecting a contractor employee from discrimination for
reporting “information that the employee reasonably believes is evidence of gross
1Alden waived his claims against NASA on appeal.
2Alden’s failure to list the reconsideration order in his notice of appeal,
which was filed after the district court denied reconsideration, does not preclude
this court from considering the reconsideration order. “A mistake in designating
the order being appealed is not fatal as long as the intent to appeal a specific
judgment can be fairly inferred and the appellee is not prejudiced or misled by the
mistake.” McCarthy v. Mayo, 827 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
2

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mismanagement of a Department of Defense contract or grant, a gross waste of
Department of Defense funds. . .”). Because this issue is dispositive, we decline to
consider the alternative arguments regarding summary judgment.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting on reconsideration
new arguments and allegations that could have been made during summary
judgment.3 United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Spectrum Worldwide, Inc., 555 F.3d 772, 780
(9th Cir. 2009). The district court was not biased merely because it ruled against
Alden. Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 1999). To the extent
Alden argues that the district court abused its discretion in limiting discovery, he
has not established actual and substantial prejudice. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296
F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth the standard).
AFFIRMED.
3To the extent that Alden filed his reconsideration motion pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), the motion was untimely. The district court
lacked the authority to extend the deadline. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2); Harman v.
Harper, 7 F.3d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 1993). However, the district court also
considered the reconsideration motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b). The Rule 60(b) motion was timely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(c)(1).
3

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