Isaac Neemias Cantarero- Pineda v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ISAAC NEEMIAS CANTARERO-
PINEDA,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 22-56
Agency No. A078-321-976
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 8, 2023**
San Francisco, California
Before: FRIEDLAND, R. NELSON, Circuit Judges and CARDONE***,
District Judge.
Isaac Neemias Cantarero-Pineda, a native and citizen of Honduras,
petitions for review of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision concurring in the
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Kathleen Cardone, United States District Judge for
the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.
FILED
MAR 15 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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negative reasonable-fear determination of an asylum officer (“AO”).
In 2019, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security notified Cantarero-
Pineda of its intent to reinstate an order of removal entered against him in
absentia in 2001. Because Cantarero-Pineda expressed a fear of returning to
Honduras, he was referred to an AO for a reasonable-fear determination. The
AO concluded that Cantarero-Pineda did not establish a reasonable fear of
persecution or torture, and Cantarero-Pineda sought review by an IJ, who
concurred.
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. See Andrade-Garcia v.
Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 835–36 (9th Cir. 2016). “We review the IJ’s
determination that the [non-citizen] did not establish a reasonable fear of
persecution or torture for substantial evidence.” Bartolome v. Sessions, 904
F.3d 803, 811 (9th Cir. 2018). We review questions of law de novo. See
Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 2007). We deny the petition.
1. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that
Cantarero-Pineda did not establish a reasonable possibility of persecution.
Cantarero-Pineda testified that he feared persecution and cites two incidents in
which he was threatened. But Cantarero-Pineda was not physically harmed, and
the fact that he remained in Honduras for several months following the incidents
indicates that the threats were not imminent. The record accordingly does not
compel the conclusion that Cantarero-Pineda suffered past persecution, and he
offered no other evidence in support of his argument that he is likely to face

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persecution in the future. See Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1063–64 (9th
Cir. 2021); Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019).
2. Assuming Cantarero-Pineda did not forfeit a challenge to the IJ’s
determination that he did not establish a reasonable possibility of torture, that
determination is supported by substantial evidence for the same reasons. See 8
C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(4)(iii); Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1067.
3. Cantarero-Pineda was not deprived of his right to counsel during
the hearing before the IJ.1 He was provided with notice of his right to obtain
counsel and a list of legal services providers six days before the hearing. In
reasonable fear proceedings commenced due to the reinstatement of a prior
order of removal, nothing more is required. See Rivera Vega v. Garland, 39
F.4th 1146, 1157 (9th Cir. 2022).
4. The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate
issues. The motion for stay of removal is otherwise denied.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
1 We assume without deciding that this issue is neither forfeited nor barred by
the “party presentation principle.” See United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S.
Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020).

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