Julio Calderon Cruz; Maira Consuelo Morales v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JULIO CALDERON CRUZ; MAIRA
CONSUELO MORALES,
Petitioners,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 21-497
Agency Nos. A072-663-902
A073-426-654
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 07, 2023**
San Francisco, California
Before: FRIEDLAND and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and KATZMANN,***
Judge.
Petitioners Julio Calderon Cruz and Maira Consuelo Morales, natives and
citizens of Guatemala, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) decision dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”)
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Gary S. Katzmann, Judge for the United States
Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
FILED
MAR 9 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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decision denying their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and dismissing
Calderon Cruz’s appeal from the IJ’s decision denying his application for
special rule cancellation of removal under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and
Central American Relief Act (“NACARA”). We deny the petition for review.
As to Calderon Cruz, substantial evidence supports the agency’s
adverse-credibility determination because Calderon Cruz admitted to giving
false statements to immigration officials in order to receive immigration
benefits. See Singh v. Holder, 643 F.3d 1178, 1180–81 (9th Cir. 2011)
(explaining that, except in narrow circumstances inapplicable here, a
noncitizen’s “deliberate deception” to “avoid being denied relief” is substantial
evidence supporting an adverse-credibility determination). In addition,
Calderon-Cruz’s challenge to the agency’s NACARA determination fails
because the IJ denied NACARA relief as a matter of discretion, which
independently foreclosed such relief. See Monroy v. Lynch, 821 F.3d 1175,
1176–78 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining that the IJ “has discretion” to grant
NACARA relief to a noncitizen who is statutorily eligible for that relief); 8
C.F.R. § 1240.64(a) (explaining that a noncitizen seeking “special rule
cancellation of removal” must establish both that they are eligible “and that
discretion should be exercised to grant relief”). Calderon-Cruz presents no
argument challenging this exercise of discretion.
As to Consuelo Morales, substantial evidence supports the agency’s

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lack-of-nexus determination for her asylum and withholding claims.
Flores-Vega v. Barr, 932 F.3d 878, 887 (9th Cir. 2019) (explaining that
“general conditions of violence related to gangs” do not establish the requisite
nexus to a protected ground). Substantial evidence—such as country condition
reports documenting the Guatemalan government’s efforts to combat the kind of
gang violence Petitioners fear—also supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief
on the basis that Petitioners failed to show that they would more likely than not
be tortured by the government or through the government’s acquiescence if
returned to Guatemala. Id.; Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th
Cir. 2016) (“[A] general ineffectiveness on the government’s part to . . . prevent
crime will not suffice to show acquiescence.”).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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