Peter Slack v. United Airlines, Inc.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PETER SLACK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 22-15507
D.C. No.
2:18-cv-00899-GMN-BNW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Gloria M. Navarro, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 10, 2023**
San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Peter Slack appeals from the district court’s summary judgment in favor of
United Airlines, Inc. in his action alleging that United engaged in gender
discrimination, racial discrimination, and retaliation when it terminated Slack’s
employment after sexual harassment allegations were made against him by female
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 11 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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colleagues. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a
district court’s summary judgment de novo, Carver v. Molder, 606 F.3d 690, 695
(9th Cir. 2010), and we affirm.
The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to United on
Slack’s gender discrimination claim. Slack failed to prove a prima facie case of
gender discrimination because he failed to provide evidence that similarly situated
employees not in his protected class were treated more favorably than he was.
Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 2020). Even if
Slack’s contention on this element—that the female colleagues who accused him
of sexual harassment in fact sexually harassed him but were not terminated—was
supported by evidence, the female colleagues are not similarly situated to Slack
because Slack’s conduct gave rise to a formal sexual harassment complaint while
the female colleagues’ alleged conduct was raised only “defensively in the context
of the company’s investigations.” See Hawn v. Executive Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d
1151, 1160–61 (9th Cir. 2010). Additionally, even if Slack had alleged his prima
facie case, Slack failed to provide evidence that United’s proffered legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for his termination—Slack’s violation of United’s sexual
harassment policy—was pretext for gender discrimination. Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los
Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2003).
The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to United on

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Slack’s retaliation claim. Slack did not prove that he engaged in a protected
activity. Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000). His
contentions that he challenged the “harassment culture” at United or that other
employees sexually harassed him were unsupported by evidence other than his
own statements. Even if they were supported, he again failed to provide evidence
that United’s termination of him for violating its sexual harassment policy was
pretextual.
The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to United on
Slack’s racial discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. As with his gender
discrimination claim, he failed to make out a prima facie case because he failed to
provide evidence that similarly situated employees outside his race were treated
more favorably than he was. Zeinali v. Raytheon Co., 636 F.3d 544, 552 (9th Cir.
2011). Additionally, Slack failed to prove that, “but for race, [he] would not have
suffered the loss of a legally protected right.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr.
Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1019 (2020).
AFFIRMED.

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