United States of America v. Sergio Antonio Haro

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SERGIO ANTONIO HARO,
Defendant,
and
ERIN MICHELLE CARRILLO,
Real-party-in-interest-
Appellant.
No. 21-10280
D.C. No.
4:05-cr-00125-DCB-BPV-2
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
David C. Bury, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 17, 2022**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: BYBEE, OWENS, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 14 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Attorney Erin Carrillo, who represented defendant Sergio Haro at
resentencing, appeals from the district court’s order imposing $1,000 in sanctions
on her under District of Arizona Local Rule 83.1(f) for violating the court’s order
to timely file a sentencing memorandum and for failing to be prepared at the
resentencing hearing. We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s
imposition of sanctions on an attorney for violating a local rule. See Toombs v.
Leone, 777 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1985). As the parties are familiar with the
facts, we do not recount them here. We vacate the sanctions order.
In Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 885 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1989), we discussed
the limits of a district court’s discretion to impose a monetary sanction on counsel
for violating the local rules. We explained that “any sanction imposed must be
proportionate to the offense and commensurate with principles of restraint and
dignity inherent in judicial power,” which “includes a responsibility to consider the
usefulness of more moderate penalties before imposing a monetary sanction.” Id.
at 1480. We also noted that “lectures in open court are often sufficient to press
home the significance of local rules, particularly for a first offense.” Id. at 1480
n.24. And we held that “absent grossly negligent, reckless, or willful conduct,
monetary penalties such as jury costs or judicial sanctions cannot be fairly levied
against counsel for a violation of the local rules.” Id. at 1480.
Here, the monetary sanction imposed on Carrillo was disproportionate to her

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conduct. She did not deliberately or repeatedly flout court orders or rules, but
rather filed an unopposed motion for a continuance before the sentencing
memorandum was due because she needed more time to adequately prepare and
would be in trial the week of the deadline. After the court denied her initial request
for a continuance, Carrillo’s email response to the judicial assistant again tried to
make the court aware that she was not prepared to proceed with sentencing and
would be renewing her motion to seek a continuance. Although perhaps Carrillo
could have planned ahead more effectively or used a more deferential tone in her
email, her conduct did not warrant a monetary sanction. The district court made no
finding that Carrillo’s conduct was “grossly negligent, reckless, or willful,” and the
record would not support such a finding. Id.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in
imposing a $1,000 sanction on Carrillo. As in Zambrano, “remand is not
necessary because a sufficient understanding of the issues may be gleaned from the
record without the aid of separate findings.” Id. at 1484 n.32.
Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.1
VACATED.
1 Carrillo’s Unopposed Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED. 9th Cir. Dkt.
No. 9.

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