Fengxia Wei v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FENGXIA WEI,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 21-70175
Agency No. A206-574-006
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 16, 2022**
San Francisco, California
Before: McKEOWN and KOH, Circuit Judges, and SESSIONS,*** District Judge.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable William K. Sessions III, United States District Judge
for the District of Vermont, sitting by designation.
FILED
DEC 9 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Fengxia Wei petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’
(“BIA”) final removal order affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her
motion to terminate removal proceedings and her application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and voluntary departure. We have jurisdiction under 8
U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition in part and dismiss in part. Because the
parties are familiar with the facts, we need not recount them here.
The IJ did not err in concluding that Wei failed to establish her eligibility for
asylum or withholding of removal. The IJ’s adverse credibility finding was
supported by substantial evidence and therefore deserves deference. “[F]alsehoods
and fabrications weigh particularly heavily in the adverse credibility inquiry.”
Kumar v. Garland, 18 F.4th 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2021). The IJ permissibly
considered that Wei had submitted false information in her visa application and
that Wei’s household registration contained several falsities. See Singh v. Holder,
643 F.3d 1178, 1181 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that volitional lies to immigration
officials will support an adverse credibility finding except in the “strictly limited
instances” in which a “genuine refugee” lies to flee a place of persecution) (citation
omitted). These findings were both supported by substantial evidence and were
sufficient to support the adverse credibility finding. See Li v. Garland, 13 F.4th
954, 960 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Even though the discrepancies regarding Li’s treatment
in jail and her husband’s employment are not necessarily probative of Li’s lack of

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veracity, her submission of false information in her asylum and visa applications
are inconsistencies sufficient to support the adverse credibility determination.”).
The IJ’s determination that Wei failed to rehabilitate her credibility with
sufficient corroborating evidence was also supported by substantial evidence. The
IJ identified specific, cogent reasons to doubt the authenticity of Wei’s letters of
support and the photographs of her injuries. See Lai v. Holder, 773 F.3d 966, 970
(9th Cir. 2014). Contrary to Wei’s assertion, because the IJ found Wei not
credible, the IJ did not have to notify Wei that her corroborating evidence fell
short. See Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 2020). Since the IJ
found that Wei was not credible and that she had failed to rehabilitate her
credibility, the IJ did not err in finding that Wei had failed to establish her
eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal.
Nor did the IJ err in denying Wei voluntary departure. Because Wei
testified that she was not willing to return to China, it was reasonable for the IJ to
determine that Wei had not established her intent to depart the United States. See 8
U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(D).
Furthermore, the BIA did not err in denying Wei’s due process claim. Wei
argues that she did not understand her interpreter and that the BIA impermissibly
withheld the audio recording of her IJ hearing, which the BIA relied upon, but
neither argument warrants relief. Wei could have identified translation errors in

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the transcript, but she did not. Nor did she specify how the alleged difficulty
communicating prejudiced her. Wei also failed to state a claim due to IJ bias. “[I]f
the factual record adequately supports the denial of [a noncitizen’s] application for
relief, we cannot find that the alleged bias held by the IJ was the basis for the
denial of the application.” Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 919, 926 (9th
Cir. 2007).
Finally, as the BIA noted, Wei withdrew her claim for protection under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) at her hearing before the IJ. Because she
failed to exhaust this claim before the agency, we lack jurisdiction to review it
here. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[E]xhaustion of
administrative remedies is a prerequisite to our jurisdiction.”).
PETITION DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.

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