Amanda Rachel Bradshaw v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

21-36014Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitDec 8, 2022

Full text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AMANDA RACHEL BRADSHAW,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 21-36014
D.C. No. 3:20-cv-00434-BR
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Anna J. Brown, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 5, 2022**
Seattle, Washington
Before: McKEOWN, MILLER, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Amanda Bradshaw appeals from the district court’s order affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability
insurance benefits. We review the district court’s decision de novo, and we must
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 8 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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uphold the agency’s decision unless it “contains legal error or is not supported by
substantial evidence.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007)). We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. The administrative law judge (ALJ) did not err in discounting Bradshaw’s
testimony that her symptoms were fully disabling. Although Bradshaw testified
that her medications cause severe drowsiness and that her anxiety can make it
impossible for her to “get out the front door,” Bradshaw also stated that she
successfully attends to parenting and household tasks most days. She once
undertook a twelve-hour drive while stopping only twice and may have
periodically done house cleaning for other families. When a claimant daily engages
in housework, parenting, and errands—even when the record is “somewhat
equivocal about how regularly she [is] able to keep up with all of these
activities”—the ALJ has substantial evidence for concluding that she does not have
fully disabling symptoms. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001).
Bradshaw’s medical records also supported the ALJ’s decision to discount
Bradshaw’s testimony. A practitioner noted in January 2018 that Bradshaw was
“doing fairly well.” In early 2019, Bradshaw self-assessed her anxiety as 3/10 and
her depression as 0/10. As for Bradshaw’s irritable bowel syndrome, Bradshaw
sought no treatment for the condition after 2017, which was reason enough for the

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ALJ to discount her testimony about the severity of that impairment. Cf. Burch v.
Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005).
Because the ALJ had substantial evidence for discounting Bradshaw’s
testimony, the ALJ did not commit reversible error by ignoring the testimony of
Bradshaw’s husband. David Bradshaw’s testimony largely overlapped with
Amanda Bradshaw’s. Because “the ALJ’s well-supported reasons for rejecting the
claimant’s testimony apply equally well to the lay witness testimony,” any error in
ignoring David Bradshaw’s testimony was harmless. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d
1104, 1117 (9th Cir. 2012).
2. The ALJ also had substantial evidence for the decision to discount the
opinion of mental health provider Alicia Sager. “‘[T]he most important factors’
that the agency considers when evaluating the persuasiveness of medical opinions
are ‘supportability’ and ‘consistency.’” Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 791 (9th
Cir. 2022) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a)). Sager’s testimony lacked
supportability because she said that the sole basis for her medical evaluation was
Bradshaw’s “self-reported” symptoms. The testimony also lacked consistency. For
example, it indicated that Bradshaw was “unable to meet competitive standards” in
the area of “accept[ing] instructions and respond[ing] appropriately to criticism
from supervisors,” even though Bradshaw testified that she got along with
authority figures “wonderful[ly].”

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3. The ALJ did not err in determining that Bradshaw could perform jobs in
the national economy requiring Reasoning Level 2. Reasoning Level 2 entails
following “detailed but uninvolved . . . instructions.” U.S. Dep’t of Labor,
Dictionary of Occupational Titles app. C (4th ed. rev. 1991), 1991 WL 688702.
The ALJ also found that Bradshaw could not perform jobs with “detailed or
complex tasks.” (emphasis added). But this finding does not undermine the
determination that Bradshaw met Reasoning Level 2.
“[E]ven when an agency explains its decision with ‘less than ideal clarity,’ a
reviewing court will not upset the decision on that account ‘if the agency’s path
may reasonably be discerned.’” Alaska Dep’t of Env’t Conservation v. EPA, 540
U.S. 461, 497 (2004) (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight
System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)). Had the ALJ found that Bradshaw was
unable to perform “detailed and complex” tasks, instead of “detailed or complex”
tasks, the ALJ’s decision would harmonize fully. And, aside from the use of “or”
instead of “and” in this one comment, the record provides no indication that the
ALJ intended to find that Bradshaw could not follow detailed but uninvolved
instructions. The ALJ determined that Bradshaw could perform “simple and
routine work tasks,” a formulation that courts have held corresponds to Level 2
Reasoning and the “detailed but uninvolved” work it entails. E.g., Zavalin v.
Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 2015). Moreover, the psychologist on whom

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the ALJ relied in determining that Bradshaw could not perform “detailed or
complex tasks” also opined that Bradshaw was “not significantly limited” in her
“ability to complete a normal workday and workweek.”
4. Because the ALJ appropriately discounted Bradshaw’s testimony and the
medical opinions of Alicia Sager, the ALJ had no obligation to inform the
vocational expert of the limitations on Bradshaw’s functioning expressed in their
testimony. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175–76 (9th Cir.
2008).
AFFIRMED.

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