Procentury Insurance Company v. A. EDWARD EZOR, DBA The Law Offices of A. Edward Ezor

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PROCENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
A. EDWARD EZOR, DBA The Law Offices
of A. Edward Ezor,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 21-56379
D.C. No. 2:10-cv-07293-PA-FFM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 15, 2022**
Before: CANBY, CALLAHAN, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
A. Edward Ezor appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his
motion to set aside its renewal of judgment in ProCentury Insurance Company’s
(“ProCentury”) diversity action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review for an abuse of discretion. Casey v. Albertson’s Inc., 362 F.3d 1254,
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 25 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 21-56379
1257 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ezor’s motion
because ProCentury’s application for renewal of judgment was consistent with
California law. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 683.130(a) (stating a money judgment
may be renewed by filing application within 10 years of original judgment); In re
Levander v. Prober (In re Levander), 180 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting
that Rule 69(a) “permits judgment creditors to use any execution method consistent
with the practice and procedure of the state in which the district court sits”
(quotation marks omitted)); Goldman v. Simpson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 729, 733 (Ct.
App. 2008) (“We also note that there is no statutory requirement that the notice of
renewal be served on the judgment debtor in order for the renewal to be
effective.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ezor’s motion to
recuse the district judge because Ezor failed to demonstrate that a reasonable
person would believe the judge’s impartiality could be questioned. See United
States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453-54 (9th Cir. 1997) (setting forth standard
of review and discussing standard for recusal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ezor’s motion for
reconsideration because Ezor set forth no valid grounds for reconsideration. See
Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63

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3 21-56379
(9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ezor’s motion to
strike because Ezor did not demonstrate grounds to strike the application for
renewal of judgment. See United States v. $133,420.00 in U.S. Currency, 672 F.3d
629, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (setting forth standard of review).
AFFIRMED.

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