Richard Rynn v. FIRST TRANSIT, INC., an Ohio Corporation; UNKNOWN PARTIES

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICHARD RYNN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
FIRST TRANSIT, INC., an Ohio
Corporation; UNKNOWN PARTIES,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 21-16836
D.C. No. 2:20-cv-01309-JJT
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
John Joseph Tuchi, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 15, 2022**
Before: CANBY, CALLAHAN, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Richard Rynn appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his
diversity action alleging state law claims arising out of a complaint made against
him by a coworker. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo the district court’s rulings on cross-motions for summary judgment. Hamby
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 23 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 2016). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for First Transit on
Rynn’s defamation claim because Rynn failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether First Transit’s employees defamed him. See Dube v.
Likins, 167 P.3d 93, 104 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (setting forth elements of a
defamation claim under Arizona law); Bailey v. Superior Court, 636 P.2d 144, 146
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (explaining that statements made in context of judicial
proceedings are “absolutely privileged” against a charge of defamation “if they are
connected with or have any bearing on or are related to the subject of inquiry”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for First Transit on
Rynn’s negligence claim because Rynn failed to allege that he was owed a duty
and failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether First Transit breached any duty
owed to Rynn and whether any of First Transit’s actions injured Rynn. See Gipson
v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 228, 230 (Ariz. 2007) (en banc) (setting forth elements of a
negligence claim under Arizona law); see also Craig v. M & O Agencies, Inc., 496
F.3d 1047, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that Arizona workers compensation
law bars employee claims for negligent investigation, negligent hiring, and
negligent retention, absent “willful misconduct” by an employer).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in striking Rynn’s filings
purporting to remove to the district court an action from the Arizona Supreme

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Court to which First Transit was not a party. See Nurse v. United States, 226 F.3d
996, 1000 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth standard of review); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)
(providing that a court may strike immaterial and impertinent pleadings).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rynn’s motion for
additional discovery and motion to compel because Rynn failed to describe or
explain the relevance of the discovery he sought. See Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of
Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth standard of
review and explaining that “a decision to deny discovery will not be disturbed
except upon the clearest showing that the denial of discovery results in actual and
substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant”). Although Rynn contends that
the district court should have granted his motion to supplement, Rynn was
provided with an opportunity in connection with summary judgment to submit the
evidence outlined in his motion.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rynn’s motion to
file a second amended complaint, which Rynn filed after the close of discovery and
after summary judgment briefing was complete, because granting the motion
would have prejudiced First Transit. See Yakama Indian Nation v. State of Wash.
Dep’t of Revenue, 176 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999) (setting forth standard of
review and explaining denial of leave to amend is warranted if amendment “would
cause prejudice to the opposing party . . . or create[] undue delay”).

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The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rynn’s post-
judgment motions for relief because Rynn failed to establish any basis for relief.
See Sch. Dist. No. 1J Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-
63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and discussing when
reconsideration is appropriate); see also Lindauer v. Rogers, 91 F.3d 1355, 1357
(9th Cir. 1996) (“[O]nce judgment has been entered in a case, a motion to amend
the complaint can only be entertained if the judgment is first reopened under a
motion brought under Rule 59 or 60.”).
We do not consider Rynn’s challenges to the district court’s December 13,
2021 order because they are outside the scope of this appeal.
We reject as unsupported by the record Rynn’s contentions that the district
court judge was biased or prejudiced against Rynn, and that the judge should have
recused himself.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
First Transit’s request to strike Rynn’s opening brief and dismiss this appeal,
set forth in the answering brief, is denied.
All pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.

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