WILLIAM H. GILLIAM, Individually, as Personal Representative ESTATE VIVIAN T. LORD v. Porter McGuire Kiakona & Chow, Llp

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WILLIAM H. GILLIAM, Individually, as
Personal Representative ESTATE VIVIAN
T. LORD; and, as successor, a dissolved
Hawaii Corporation, Pacific Rim Property
Service Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PORTER MCGUIRE KIAKONA & CHOW,
LLP,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 21-16097
D.C. No. 1:20-cv-00372-JMS-KJM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
J. Michael Seabright, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 15, 2022**
Before: CANBY, CALLAHAN, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
William H. Gilliam appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Gilliam’s requests for oral
argument, set forth in the opening and reply briefs, are denied.
FILED
NOV 23 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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dismissing for lack of standing his action alleging violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo. Meland v. WEBER, 2 F.4th 838, 843 (9th Cir. 2021).
We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed for lack of standing Gilliam’s FDCPA
claim because Gilliam failed to allege facts sufficient to establish an injury in fact
as required for Article III standing. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560-61 (1992) (explaining that constitutional standing requires an “injury in fact,”
causation, and redressability; “injury in fact” refers to “an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual or
imminent” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Gilliam’s action
without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth
standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper
when amendment would be futile).
We reject as meritless Gilliam’s contention that he is the owner of the
condominium property at issue in this action.
Gilliam’s opposed motion for miscellaneous relief (Docket Entry No. 34) is
denied. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining

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that arguments or allegations raised for the first time on appeal are not considered);
United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining that
documents and facts not presented to the district court are not considered on
appeal).
AFFIRMED.

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