Vadim Stanley Miesegaes v. MALINDA DURNEN, AKA Mindy, Shift- Lead;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VADIM STANLEY MIESEGAES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MALINDA DURNEN, AKA Mindy, Shift-
Lead; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
PATRICK McLAUGHLIN,
Defendant.
No. 21-55708
D.C. No. 2:20-cv-09945-CJC-RAO
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 15, 2022**
Before: SILVERMAN, WATFORD, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
California civil detainee Vadim Stanley Miesegaes appeals pro se from the
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUN 29 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
constitutional violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo the district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Miesegaes’s Fourteenth Amendment
claim against defendants Durnen and Smith because Miesegaes failed to allege
facts sufficient to show that hourly announcements of “ice” or “hot water” were
punitive or excessive in relation to a non-punitive purpose. See Jones v. Blanas,
393 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that civil detainees cannot be
subjected to conditions that are “expressly intended to punish,” “excessive in
relation to [a non-punitive] purpose,” or “employed to achieve objectives that
could be accomplished in so many alternative and less harsh methods”).
The district court properly dismissed Miesegaes’s Fourth Amendment claim
against defendant Black because Miesegaes failed to allege facts sufficient to show
that the searches of his person were unreasonable. See Bull v. City & County of
San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 971-74 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (setting forth
factors to evaluate whether a pretrial detention search or search policy is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, including whether a search is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests); Jones, 393 F.3d at 931-32 (noting that
the constitutional rights of civil and pretrial detainees are similar).

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The district court properly dismissed Miesegaes’s Fourteenth Amendment
claim against defendant Black alleging sleep deprivation caused by a policy of
hourly rounds at night because this claim was raised or could have been raised in
his prior federal action between the parties or their privies that resulted in a final
judgment on the merits. See Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir.
2002) (explaining that federal claim preclusion “applies when there is (1) an
identity of claims; (2) a final judgment on the merits; and (3) identity or privity
between parties” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Fund for
Animals, Inc. v. Lujan, 962 F.2d 1391, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that there is
“privity between officers of the same government”); C. Reserve Life of N.A. Ins.
Co. v. Struve, 852 F.2d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 1988) (relying on “the basis of the
claims asserted and nature of relief sought,” rather than plaintiff’s act of suing
defendants in their individual capacities, to determine that defendants were sued in
their official capacities).
The district court properly dismissed Miesegaes’s failure-to-train and
supervisory liability claims because Miesegaes failed to allege facts sufficient to
state a plausible claim. See Flores v. County of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 1159
(9th Cir. 2014) (to state a failure-to-train claim, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant “was deliberately indifferent to the need to train subordinates, and the
lack of training actually caused the constitutional harm”); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d

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1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (supervisory liability under § 1983 requires “knowledge
of and acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct” by subordinates); Hebbe v. Pliler,
627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are construed
liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible
claim for relief).
AFFIRMED.

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