Joandark Kassab v. United States of America;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOANDARK KASSAB,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
MR. D’S LIQUOR AND DELI, INC., a
California corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 19-55621
D.C. No. 3:17-cv-00399-DMS-NLS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Dana M. Sabraw, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 15, 2022**
Before: SILVERMAN, WATFORD, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
Joandark Kassab appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUN 24 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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in her action seeking judicial review of the United States Department of
Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service’s (“FNS”) final decision imposing a civil
penalty following Kassab’s sale of a store that had previously been disqualified
from participating in the federal food stamp program. We review de novo the
district court’s legal conclusions and for clear error its factual findings. Wong v.
United States, 859 F.2d 129, 131 (9th Cir. 1988). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Kassab failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether she was allowed to sell her
store without penalty after it was permanently disqualified for trafficking in
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) benefits. See 7 U.S.C.
§ 2021(e)(1) (a person who sells or otherwise transfers ownership of a store that
has been disqualified from participating in the SNAP program “shall be subjected
to a civil penalty in an amount established by the Secretary”); 7 C.F.R. § 278.6(g)
(method by which FNS determines amount of civil penalties for transfer of
ownership); see also Kim v. United States, 121 F.3d 1269, 1273 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that under the Food Stamp Act “even innocent owners” may be
disqualified permanently for trafficking violations).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kassab’s motion for
reconsideration because Kassab failed to establish any basis for such relief. See
Sch. Dist. No. 1J Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63

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(9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration).
Kassab is not entitled to reversal of the district court’s summary judgment
based on her claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Nicholson v. Rushen,
767 F.2d 1426, 1427 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Generally, a plaintiff in a civil case has no
right to effective assistance of counsel.”).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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