Dena R. Linton-Helms v. PAULA J. MEYERS, Superintendent, Coffee Creek Correctional Facility

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DENA R. LINTON-HELMS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
PAULA J. MEYERS, Superintendent,
Coffee Creek Correctional Facility,
Respondent-Appellee.
No. 21-35172
D.C. No. 3:19-cv-00877-SI
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael H. Simon, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 7, 2022
Portland, Oregon
Before: GRABER and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and REISS,** District Judge.
Petitioner Dena Linton-Helms appeals the district court’s dismissal of her
ineffective assistance of counsel claim as procedurally defaulted in its denial of her
habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We have jurisdiction under
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Christina Reiss, United States District Judge for the District of
Vermont, sitting by designation.
FILED
JUN 21 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2
28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. We review the district court’s denial of habeas relief
de novo, Dyer v. Hornbeck, 706 F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 2013), and review for
abuse of discretion the denial of an evidentiary hearing, Runningeagle v. Ryan, 825
F.3d 970, 990 (9th Cir. 2016).
After briefing and oral argument in this case, the Supreme Court decided
Shinn v. Ramirez, 142 S. Ct. 1718 (2022), which the parties addressed in
supplemental briefing. The parties dispute whether the government has waived any
objection to the new evidence that was submitted before the federal district court.
But it is unnecessary for us to resolve that dispute because, even assuming without
deciding that any objection to the new evidence in this case has been waived,
Petitioner still does not prevail.
The parties, and we, agree that Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claim (for inadequate communication during plea negotiations) is
procedurally defaulted because she failed to raise it on state collateral review.
Accordingly, we may not consider the defaulted claim unless Petitioner can satisfy
the “narrow exception” announced in Martinez by demonstrating cause to excuse
the default and actual prejudice from the alleged error. See Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2012).
To establish cause, Petitioner must demonstrate that her post-conviction relief
counsel “was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct.

-- 2 of 3 --

3
2052, 80 L.Ed. 674 (1984).” Ramirez v. Ryan, 937 F.3d 1230, 1241 (9th Cir. 2019).
In turn, Strickland requires a showing of both deficient performance and prejudice.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
On the existing record that we may consider on the merits under Shinn, 142
S. Ct. at 1734, which is limited to the state-court record, Petitioner failed to satisfy
either prong of Strickland because the evidence, even viewed in her favor, is unclear
and conflicting. Thus, Petitioner has not carried her burden.
Even if additional evidence in Petitioner’s favor were to come to light at an
evidentiary hearing, under Shinn the district court could not grant relief based on any
such additional evidence. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion
by denying an evidentiary hearing.
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --