Russell Strickland v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RUSSELL STRICKLAND,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 21-16144
D.C. No. 2:20-cv-01094-JDP
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Jeremy D. Peterson, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 7, 2022**
Anchorage, Alaska
Before: HURWITZ, BRESS, and H. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Russell Strickland appeals the district court’s order affirming the Social
Security Commissioner’s denial of his application for disability benefits and
supplemental security income under the Social Security Act. We review the district
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUN 9 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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court’s decision de novo. We may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of social
security benefits only if the decision of the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) “was
not supported by substantial evidence . . . or if the ALJ applied the wrong legal
standard.” Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
1. At step four, the ALJ determined that Strickland can perform his past
relevant work (“PRW”) as generally performed and was therefore not disabled.
This conclusion followed from two key factual findings. First, the ALJ determined
that Strickland has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) “to perform light
work,” subject to certain further limitations, including no more than four hours of
standing and six hours of sitting in an eight-hour day. Second, the ALJ determined
that, given his RFC, Strickland can perform his PRW as a parts order and stock
clerk as generally performed, as defined by the Dictionary of Occupational Titles
(“DOT”), 1991 WL 672333.
2. Substantial evidence supports the RFC determination. The ALJ did
not err in characterizing Strickland’s RFC as light, rather than sedentary. That
determination was permissibly based on the testimony of a vocational expert
(“VE”) that Strickland was “not precluded” from performing “light” work that
included a “sit-stand option” and the aforementioned limits on standing. Moore v.
Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2000).

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3. Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s conclusions that
Strickland had PRW as a “parts order and stock clerk,” and that Strickland can
perform this PRW as generally performed in light of his RFC.
The ALJ’s determination that Strickland had PRW as a “parts order and
stock clerk” was substantially supported by the VE’s testimony and the description
of that occupation in the DOT, 1991 WL 672333. Both the DOT and the VE’s
testimony confirm that this PRW is performed at a light level throughout the
national economy, DOT, 1991 WL 672333, and the ALJ was not required to credit
the testimony of Strickland’s retained expert over the testimony of the VE. That
Strickland previously performed his job at a medium level is not determinative of
whether he can perform his PRW as “generally performed” in the national
economy. Stacy v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 563, 569 (9th Cir. 2016).
AFFIRMED.

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